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DO INVESTORS OVER-REACT TO PATTERNS OF PAST 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES? 
ABSTRACT 
The objectives of this thesis are threefold. First, this dissertation examines 
whether patterns (growth and consistency in growth) of firms' past financial performance 
influence investors' perceptions about stock values and future performance of these 
firms. Second, multiple estimation horizons of past performance variables (ranging from 
one to five years) are used to assess whether the interaction between growth patterns and 
measurement interval lengths of these variables influence investor expectations. Third, 
this thesis examines whether an intermediate price drifts (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman 
[1993]) and subsequent long-horizon price reversal (e.g. DeBondt and Thaler (1985)l are 
manifestations of a market over-reaction as suggested in recent studies (e.g. Lee and 
Swaminathail [2000]). 
Annual data on sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns over various time 
periods from a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ exchanges from 1983 to 1999 are used to address the research questions 
proposed in this thesis. The evidence provided in this study shows that low-growth firms 
outperform their high-growth firm counterparts across different performance variables, 
estimation intervals, and investment horizons except in the first post-formation year for 
firms ranked by their prior one-year financial growth rate (except for sales growth). 
These return differentials between low and high growth firms increase uniformly as more 
years of past financial performance added. 
Furthermore, when ranking firms based on the consistency of their prior financial 
growth rates over multiple estimation periods, this study finds that a firm consistently 
achieving low (high) growth rates that places it in the lowest (highest) growth 40 percent 
earns high (low) stock returns. The consistency in a firm's prior financial performance 
influences the behavior of its future stock returns, i.e. the longer the consistency of 
exceptionally strong (weak) performance of a firm, the greater (lower) its subsequent 
stock returns. However, the incremental impact of an additional year of growth 
consistency on future returns seems to dissipate after the third year of prior performance 
data, suggesting that it may not take investors longer than three years to assume that a 
firm's past growth will continue for many years to come. Thus, additional evidence 
confirming investors' prior beliefs will not lead to a significant price drift because their 
expectations are already reflected in market prices. 
First year returns for firms except SG exhibit a strong financial drift. The price 
drift seems to persist even with longer estimation horizons. Multiple regression analyses 
suggest that reported higher returns for low-growth firms is not due to risk as measured 
by market betas or book-to-market ratios, nor is it due to the disproportioiiate impact 
caused by relatively smaller firms. As well, the one-year-ahead size-adjusted abnormal 
vii 
returns are significantly and negatively related to the size-adjusted abnormal returns for 
years 2 through 5. This result indicates that the evidence of a price drift reported in the 
first post-formation year might be due to a market over-reaction, a finding consistent with 
results reported by Lee and Swaminathan (2000). In additional analysis, return 
performance for all growth portfolios for the month of January is compared to the 
remainder of the year. No evidence indicating that returns to these portfolios are driven 
by extraordinary performance of low-growth firms in the month of January. 
For all variables (except for past sales growth and to some degree past stock 
returns), the financial drift in year one return for portfolios based on prior-one year of 
past performance data, is significantly stronger than that reported in Chan et al. (2004). 
Results reported in this thesis indicate that the average abnormal return differential 
between low and high growth firms for the five-year estimation intervals (with exception 
of past sales growth) is greater than1 0 percentage points. The evidence contradicts that 
documented in Chan et al. (2004). They find no discernable evidence of price reversals 
over the next 36-months after ranking firms by their five-year growth rates in sales, 
operating income, and net income. However, results of this study are consistent with the 
predictions of behavioral models (e.g. Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lakonishok et al. [1994]) 
suggesting that investors put excessive weight on patterns of a firm's past financial 
performance when projecting its future prospects. 
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DO INVESTORS OVER-REACT TO PATTERNS OF PAST 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES? 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
The efficient markets hypothesis holds that stock market prices reflect their 
fundamental values and that stock returns cannot be predicted from publicly available 
information (e.g., Fama [1970, 199 11). It follows that markets incorporate new 
information in asset prices in a timely fashion and without bias. Furthermore, even if 
some market participants make errors, their mistakes are independent across individuals; 
thus, these mistakes average out in market equilibrium (e.g., Fama [1965]). 
However, Lee (2001, pg. 237) argues that "market efficiency is a journey, not a 
destination," and the market price mechanism is a continuous process in which market 
prices converge toward fundamental values through the interactions between quasi- 
rational traders (Lee refers to them as noise traders) and fully informed arbitrageurs.' He 
argues that equating market prices with fundamental values is a nai've and conceptually 
unsound assumption because it mischaracterizes the price discovery mechanism. In this 
context. the salient features of capital market research that will have a significant impact 
' Imperfectly rational, quasi-rational, less rational, and boundedly rational are used interchangeably to 
describe investors with limited information processing and problem solving ability that prevent them from 
making perfectly rational decisions. 
on the future will be: "(1) decision-driven, (2) interdisciplinary in nature and (3) 
prospective in focus (Lee, 2001, pg. 247)." 
Decision-driven research focuses on the behavior of decision-makers. How do 
decision makers reach their decisions? What factors influence their decisions? How do 
they use or misuse information signals? In capital market settings, accounting researchers 
have a crucial role in addressing issues such as how investors make their investment 
decisions and how accounting information influences their investment decision-making 
processes (Lee, 2001). 
Interdisciplinary research addresses the notion that accounting output is not the 
sole determinant of economic decisions. To have a significant and enduring impact in 
today's business environment, future capital market-based accounting research should be 
interdisciplinary in nature (Lee, 2001). Thaler (1999) predicts that the future will focus 
on the study of behavioral finance; Lee (2001) concurs that the trend is undoubtedly in 
this direction. The demand of quasi-rational investors is an integrated part of market price 
formation (e.g., Shiller [I9841 and Hirshleifer and Luo [2001]). Lee (2001) argues that to 
affect market prices, the behavior of imperfectly rational investors must be systematic, 
and the role of accounting researchers is to contribute to our understanding about factors 
that give rise to these common investor sentiments and their impact on the market pricing 
mechanism. 
Prospective focus research is more concerned with the allocation of capital 
resources in the economy through enhancing our understanding about future economic 
decisions and factors that influence their outcomes (Lee, 2001). Traditionally, however, 
capital market research in accounting tends to be historical in nature. This focus may 
limit the contribution of accounting researchers in the area of understanding market 
forces and their impact on the mechanism of market prices. 
A growing body of literature on judgments and decision making processes 
suggests that divergence from rationality is pervasive due to limitations of time, 
information processing capacities, and other cognitive resource constraints (e.g., 
Hirshleifer [200 11, Mullainathan and Thaler [2000], Simon [1955], Trivers [1985, 199 11, 
and Tversky and Kahneman [1974]). Tversky and Kahneman (1 974) argue that because 
of these cognitive constraints, people tend to use representativeness heuristics to tackle 
difficult and complex decision problems.2 They argue that individuals are inclined to 
classify things into completely distinct and independent groups based on descriptive 
characteristics and salient, attention-grabbing, and easy to recall clues that are more likely 
to be given stronger emphasis. Chan, Frankel, and Kothari (2004) suggest that financial 
performance metrics are both "salient" and readily "available" to the vast majority of 
financial market participants. 
1.2 The Objectives and Motivations of the Study 
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, it examines whether patterns 
(growth and consistency in growth) of past financial performance of a given firm or 
group of firms influence the formation of investor perceptions about stock values and 
future performance of these firms. Specifically, the present study investigates whether 
growth and consistency in growth of historical financial performance of firms make it 
more likely that investors form mistaken expectations about the future performance of 
The term "representativeness heuristic" refers to a simplified "rule of thumb" developed to deal with 
complex and difficult tasks. 
these firms, driving market prices above (below) their fundamental values and, as a 
result, subsequently earn low (high) returns. Second, using varying measurement 
horizons of past performance variables, this study investigates whether the interaction 
between patterns and measurement horizons of these variables affect investor 
expectations. Finally, this thesis examines whether the documented momentum profits 
and subsequent long-horizon price reversals are a manifestation of a market over-reaction 
to patterns of past financial metricse3 Specifically, using post-formation holding periods 
of five years, the present study assesses whether ,the momentum gains over the twelve 
months following the portfolio formation date are offset by long-term return reversals 
over ,the remaining four-year holding period. 
The body of literature over the last two decades indicates that the behavior of 
future stock returns can be predicted from firms' past financial performance measures 
such as changes in sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns. Specifically, researchers 
have uncovered two market regularities: market momentum (under-reaction) and long- 
run price reversals (over-reaction). Market under-reaction is defined as positive 
autocorrelations in stock returns over horizons ranging from three to twelve months. 
Market over-reaction is defined as price reversals over the longer horizons of three to five 
years. The under-reaction hypothesis suggests that investors are inclined to slowly 
incorporate new fundamental signals into market prices, causing stock returns to drift in a 
positive or negative direction as indicated by these signals over the short-term (e.g., 
Jegadeesh and Titman [I9931 and Bernard and Thomas [1989, 19901). On the other hand, 
the over-reaction hypothesis posits that investors are likely to over-react to extreme past 
3 In this thesis, long run, long-term, long period, and long horizon are used interchangeably and refer to a 
period of  time greater than twelve months but not more than five years. 
financial performance, driving stock prices of firms with exceptionally high (low) 
performance above (below) their fundamental values; as a result, these firms earn low 
(high) returns in the long run (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler [1985, 19871, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny [1994], and La Porta et al. [1997]). 
Prior research examining market under- and over-reaction treats these two 
phenomena as two distinct and independent phenomena. However, recent studies provide 
mixed findings. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
document market momentum over the ensuing twelve months following the portfolio 
formation, but this momentum reverses over longer periods. These authors interpret their 
evidence as suggesting a market over-reaction that recovers to fundamentals over the 
long run. For example, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) examine the interaction between 
past trading volume and past stock returns and its impact on the profitability of 
momentum strategy. They maintain that the momentum profit reported by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) is offset by long-run return reversals. They argue that "this finding is 
important because it refutes the common presumption that price momentum is simply a 
market under-reaction. Instead, the evidence suggests that at least a portion of the initial 
momentum gain is better characterized as an over-reaction (pg. 2,018)." On the other 
hand, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) suggest that the link between market momentum 
and long-run price reversals, if it exists, is weak because each phenomenon is driven by 
different forces. 
Whether the market under- and over-reaction evolve independently, as commonly 
believed, or both are products of a market over-reaction that eventually reverts to 
fundamental values, the extensive body of evidence documented in the literature suggests 
there are systematic biases on the part of market participants that can be exploited for 
generating trading profits without bearing extra risk. The notion that the behavior of stock 
prices and returns can be predicted based on past performance measures does not square 
with the standard market models. Fania (1998), however, argues that empirical evidence 
of market under- and over-reaction is a question of chance that is anticipated by the 
efficient market theory. He goes on to assert that most long-term evidence of stock return 
predictability vanishes when firm size and book-to-market effects are included. Fama and 
French (1996) suggest that the findings of DeBondt and Thaler (1 985) and Lakonishok et 
al. (1994) are explained by multiple factor models. However, empirical studies that 
examine whether portfolio returns based on fundamentallprice measures are attributable 
to risk factors or market mispricing offer different interpretations after controlling for 
potential risk exposures (e.g., Ali et al. [2003], Dichev [1998], La Porta, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny [1997], and Piotroski [2000]). These studies find future returns 
concentrate around subsequent earnings announcements. This evidence is interpreted as 
consistent with market mispricing that subsequently corrects itself with the release of 
earnings information. 
With the growing body of evidence on the stock return predictability, behavioral 
finance has emerged as a viable alternative to explain these market regularities. However, 
before behavioral finance theorists offer a uniform theory that explains the behavior of 
market prices and stock returns in terms of investor sentiment, behavioral theorists should 
come to terms with the following issues. Do markets under-react or over-react to 
information? Which incidents cause markets to under-react and which cause markets to 
over-react? Are short-run market momentum and long-run price reversals different 
phenomena or are they a manifestation of investor over-reactions to past financial 
performance that subsequently recover to fundamentals over the longer horizons as 
suggested by some recent findings (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000])? What factors 
lead investors to have biased expectations about future firm prospects? 
1.3 Recent Theoretical Development 
Recently, several theorists contribute to the development of psychology-based 
theories that provide explanations to the documented market momentum effects and long- 
horizon price reversals based on investor behavior (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
[1998], Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam [1998], and Hoiig and Stein [1999]). 
These theorists have incorporated investors' psychology into economic models to offer 
an alternative framework for reconciling the evidence of these two market regularities 
(market under- and over-reaction). Lee (2001) suggests the recent theories evolved as 
rational behavioral models because they account for investor sentiments and economic 
principles as well. 
Each of these models provides a different explanation for empirical findings of 
market momeiitum and subsequent price reversals. In general, however, their 
explanations fall into two categories. Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) 
see the short-run continuations and long-horizon reversals in stock returns as distinct and 
independent phenomena. They characterize the evidence of market momentum as a 
market under-reaction and the evidence of a long-run return reversal as a response to 
market over-reaction. Momentum and reversal are attributed to the slow diffusion of 
information across groups of investors in Hong and Stein's model and to systematic 
investor biases in extrapolating future earnings growth from patterns of past earnings 
changes in the model of Barberis et al. (1998). On the other hand, however, Daniel et al. 
(1 998) break ranks with the prevailing academic explanation by characterizing the market 
momentum effects and subsequent price reversals as two integrated phases in the cycle of 
a market over-reaction that eventually recovers to the fundamentals, creating momentum 
profits in the short run and return reversals over the long run. 
1.4 Unanswered Questions 
Despite the evidence on the relation between past performance variables and 
future stock returns over the last two decades and the recent theoretical development 
providing insights into the impact of investors' psychology on market prices, several 
questions remain unanswered. How do patterns of firms' past financial performance 
variables influence investor expectations about future performance? How does the 
interplay between patterns and measurement horizons of past performance metrics affect 
the formation of investor perceptions about a firm's future prospects? Finally, is the profit 
to be gained from trades based on market momentum and subsequent return reversals a 
manifestation of a market over-reaction as suggested by recent empirical and theoretical 
works (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Daniel et al. [1998])? Alternatively, are 
these two market regularities driven by different and independent forces, as commonly 
believed? This thesis attempts to shed some light on these unanswered questions. 
1.5 Research Methodologies 
Financial performance variables are operationalized by using annual data on sales, 
earnings, cash flow, and stock returns from a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges from 1983 to 1999. Two testing approaches 
are used, the first of which employs portfolio tests. At the end of December, various 
equally weighted stock portfolios are formed on the basis of growth patterns (growth and 
consistency in growth) for a firm's past financial performance for each measure. Each 
year, firms are sorted by the past growth rates in their performance variables and assigned 
to one of ten decile growth portfolios on the basis of this ranking. 
To construct consistent growth portfolios, each year firms are sorted by growth 
rates in their financial performance measures over the previous one through four years 
prior to the portfolio formation date and then divided into three growth groups (top 40 
percent, middle 20 percent, and bottom 40 percent). Firms in the highest (lowest) 40 
percent are called high-growth (low-growth) firms. A high-growth firm that falls in the 
top 40 percent in each single year included in the estimation interval is classified as a 
"consistent high-growth firm." Similarly, a low-growth firm that consistently ranks in the 
bottom 40 percent in each year of the estimation period is defined as a "consistent low- 
growth firm. These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years 
following portfolio formation. For years 1 through 5, annual returns and size-adjusted 
abnormal returns (SAR) are measured. To avoid potential autocorrelation in stock returns 
caused by overlapping holding horizons, each year is treated as one observation. 
The second testing method uses regression analyses. Cross-sectional regressions 
assess the relationships between past performance measures and future returns. In these 
regressions, size-adjusted abnormal returns for each firm are regressed on its past 
performance variables after controlling for the effects of market betas and market-to- 
book ratios. The coefficients from these regressions for each of the five years in the 
holding period are averaged and t-statistics are calculated using Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
procedures. 
1.6 The Relations of this Study to Prior Research 
Empirical studies in the finance and accounting literature have sought to examine 
the relations between a firm's past performance measures (both accounting-based 
financial performance and in terms of stock performance) and subsequent stock market 
returns. Past performance variables examined have included long-term growth in sales, 
earnings, and cash flow (Lakonishok et al., 1994) and La Porta et al., (1997), and 
historical stock returns (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987). The present study is related to 
this line of work in investigating the extent information contained in a firm's historical 
financial performance can predict its future stock return. However, this thesis differs from 
previous studies in several ways. 
First, as in Chan et al. (2004), the focus of this study is exploring whether growth 
and growth consistency in past financial metrics are most likely to influence investor 
perceptions about future firm prospects. Unlike three years used by Chan et al. (2004), 
tlie present study uses a longer holding period (five years) to capture the full dynamic 
relations between growth patterns of a firm's historical financial measures and its future 
stock returns. These differences in methodology allow for tests of the underlying 
premises of behavioral finance theories that suggest initial price changes and subsequent 
return reversal are manifestations of a market over-reaction (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and 
Lee and Swaminathan [2000]). Further, if it takes investors a longer horizon to realize 
that their prior expectations were biased, as is the consensus among behavioral theorists 
and empiricists, it is reasonable to assume that expanding the holding period will capture 
the process by which investors update their prior beliefs about the future prospects of past 
winners and losers. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue that studies that use holding 
horizons of less than five years have failed to capture the dynamics behind the price 
momentum and subsequent reversal. 
Second, prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and La Porta et al. [1997]) 
show that fundamental valuation measures deflated by market prices such as earnings-to- 
price (EIP) and cash-to-price (CIP) ratios have predictive power with respect to 
subsequent stock returns. However, using the market price as a deflator in these variables 
introduces a confounding effect into the relation between past performance measures and 
expected returns. Thus, it becomes difficult to determine whether the ability of these 
financial ratios to predict expected returns is due to the fundamental measures in the 
numerators themselves (e.g., earnings and cash flow) or to the market price in the 
denominators. By using per share lagged values of these measures as deflators, this study 
eliminates this potential confounding source and focuses on the marginal impact of past 
growth rates in these fundamental measures on stock returns. 
Third, previous studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], La Porta et al. [1997], and 
La Porta [1996]) use earnings plus depreciation to measure a firm's cash flow. Demas, 
Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2004) argue this definition assumes that depreciation is 
the only significant accounting accrual that affects cash flow. Instead, they suggest that 
operating cash flow, as defined in the accounting literature (earnings adjusted for 
depreciation and working capital accruals), is a more comprehensive measure of a firm's 
operating cash flows. In the present study, cash flow is measured in two ways: (1) 
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization expense, and (2) 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations adjusted for working 
capital accruals as well as depreciation and amortization expense. 
Fourth, this study uses prior annual data over time frames ranging from one to 
five years to gain insights into the interaction between firms' performance growth 
patterns and estimation horizons and effects on investor expectations. The behavioral 
models (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], Daniel et al. [1998], and Barbers et al. [1998]) 
suggest that investors put excessive weight on patterns of a firm's past performance when 
projecting its future prospects. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) report that a firm's 
mispricing is an increasing function of measurement intervals of its historical 
performance. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find that stocks with higher returns for 
longer horizons have large returns compared to their counterparts with high past returns, 
but for a shorter time period. 
Fifth, the current study investigates whether the profitability of the momentum 
strategy and subsequent return reversals are manifestations of market over-reaction to 
patterns and measurement horizons of past financial performance. Sixth, the geometric 
average is used to compute firms' past growth rates in financial performance measures 
while prior studies use the arithmetic average. The arithmetic average may overstate the 
historical growth rates in financial performance measures since it merely represents the 
summation of annual growth rate divided by the number of years ignoring a 
compounding effect. The geometric meail compounds the actual year-to-year growth 
rates and translates these annual changes into a single-period growth rate. Finally, 
although both the current study and Chan et al.'s (2004) study are motivated by the recent 
psychology-based theoretical development (e.g., Barberis et al. [1998], Daniel et al. 
[1998], and Hong and Stein [1999]), the present study is not intended to test these 
theories as Chan et al. (2004) do. 
1.7 Organization of this Study 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related 
literature, while Chapter 3 presents the theoretical and hypotheses development. Chapter 
4 discusses performance variables, their measurement, and the sample used in hypothesis 
testing. Empirical design and testing methodologies are addressed in Chapter 5. The 
empirical results of the study are presented and discussed in Chapter 6. Sensitivity 
analyses are included in Chapter 7. Finally, the findings of the study are summarized, 
their implications and limitations are discussed, and opportunities for future research are 
proposed in Chapter 8. 
CHAPTER I1 
Literature Review 
2.1 Overview 
The last two decades have seen a growing body of empirical studies that examine 
the relationship between stock returns and measures of past financial performance such as 
sales, earnings, cash flow, and past stock returns. These studies document that these 
historical measures of firms' performance predict future stock returns. According to this 
research stream, firms that achieved high past financial performance tend to be 
overvalued; eventually, stock prices of these firms return to their fundamentals, resulting 
in low returns over longer horizons. On the other hand, firms that experienced poor past 
financial performance become under-priced and subsequently their shares earn higher 
returns. These findings have been strongly linked to investor psychology (e.g., DeBondt 
and Thaler [1985, 19871, Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011, Lakonishok et al. [1994], 
Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Barberis et al. [1998], Daniel et al. [1998], and Hong and 
Stein [1999]), and this link is increasingly gaining prominence in the literature (e.g., 
Shleifer [2000]). Researchers have examined two market regularities: market under- 
reactions and market over-reactions. The evidence on these two phenomena is argued to 
refute some of the assumptions of market efficiency (e.g., Barberis et al. [1998]). Fama 
(1998), however, describes the empirical findings on the market under- and over- 
reactions as unpredicted outcomes that can be observed under market models. 
2.2 Evidence of Investor Under-reactions to Past Financial Performance 
The market under-reaction hypothesis holds that investors do not adequately 
respond to fundamental information in a timely fashion. Rather, new information is 
gradually impounded into market prices, leading to positive short-horizon 
autocorrelations in stock returns or market momentum effects. Barberis et al. (1998) 
define a market that under-reacts to information as one in which a firm's average 
abnormal return after good news is greater than average abnormal return following bad 
news. Over the last two decades numerous studies investigate the predictions of the 
under-reaction hypothesis. Major papers in this area will be reviewed next. 
To examine the profitability of market momeiitum trading strategies, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) study NYSE and AMEX firms from 1968 to 1989. They form 
momentum portfolios that take a long position in stocks with the highest returns in the 
past three to twelve months and a short position in stocks with the lowest returns over the 
same horizons. They then examine the behavior of stock returns over the ensuing 36 
months after the portfolio formation period. Their findings show that momentum 
portfolios earn mean abnormal returns of about one percent per month over the 
subsequent twelve months. However, about one half of this gain is offset by return 
reversals over the next 24 month period. As well, they examine the behavior of returns to 
their trading strategies around future earnings announcements. They find past winners 
outperform past losers on the earnings announcement dates over the first seven months 
after formation, while past losers earn higher returns compared to past winners over the 
balance of their holding period. They attribute the profitability of this momentum strategy 
to investor under-reaction to information contained in past price movements. They argue 
that investors are too slow to update their prior beliefs, and this leads to the observed 
temporary positive drift in stock returns. Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) 
examine market momentum profitability and how it is affected by earnings drift. To 
measure earnings surprise, they use stock price responses to unexpected earnings 
announcements, standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and revision of analysts' 
earnings forecasts. They find that these variables, along with past stock returns, predict 
subsequent stock returns for Iiorizons ranging from three to twelve months subsequent to 
portfolio formation. Stocks of firms with higher earnings surprises or high past returns 
are more likely to outperform their counterparts with negative earnings surprises or low 
past returns. Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan et al. (1996) conclude 
that investors do not incorporate information in market prices in a timely manner. Rather, 
information is impounded in stock prices after a time lag. They find the earnings drift 
partially explains the price momentum effect, but the latter is not subsumed by earnings 
surprise effects. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) extend their previous analysis to 1998 and report 
similar evidence. Their finding shows a cumulative profit for momentum portfolios of 
12.17 percent over the first 12 months, but the cumulative return from months 13 through 
60 is negative. The findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,2001) are confirmed by Lee 
and Swaminathan (2000) who provide evidence that past winners continue to earn higher 
returns over three-to-twelve months, but over longer periods of three-to-five years past 
losers outperform their past winner counterparts. Similarly, classifying NYSE and 
AMEX firms into past winners and losers based on their stock returns for the last six 
months, Grundy and Martin (2001) find market momentum returns from the 1920s to the 
1990s even after controlling for potential sources of risk exposure. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) examine whether industry momentum accounts 
for the profitability of .the price momentum strategy. Their findings show that market 
momentum is subsumed by industry effects. They suggest that their results could be 
indicative of investor herding behavior. In other words, trend chasing investors might 
rush to buy (sell) firms in "hot" ("cold") industries. They argue that this pattern of 
behavior creates price pressure, leading to continuing price momentum. However, their 
findings are contradicted by those of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Grundy and 
Martin (2000). Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that only about 20 percent of 
momentum gains is explained by industry. Grundy and Martin (2000) find that the 
industry effect is not a significant source of momentum returns. 
2.3 Evidence of Investor Over-reactions to Past Financial Performance 
Studies addressing the market over-reaction hypothesis argue that investors over- 
react to past financial performance. In this manner, investors drive stocks with high 
historical financial measures above their fundamental values. These stocks eventually 
under-perform the market over longer periods when investors realize that their previous 
expectations have not materialized. On the other hand, prices of stocks with poor past 
financial performance are pushed below .their fundamental values. Subsequently, these 
stocks earn higher returns over the long horizon when future performance exceeds 
investor expectations. Barberis et al. (1998) define a market that over-reacts to 
information as one in which the average return on firm's stock in periods subsequent to a 
series of favorable information is lower than the average return after a string of 
unfavorable news. The seminal paper of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) is among the 
pioneering works that use psychological evidence to explain investor behavior. DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) posit two hypotheses: (1) if investors over-react to information 
contained in past financial variables, expected stock returns can be predicted from past 
returns alone, and (2) extreme market price movements are followed by another 
movement with comparable magnitude, but in the opposite direction. Studying cross- 
sectional data of U.S. stock returns from 1926 to 1982, they provide evidence supporting 
their hypotheses. They test their hypotheses by forming investment strategies that call for 
buying stocks that have performed poorly in the last five years and selling stocks that 
outperformed the market in the same period. They find that buying stocks with lower 
returns over the last five years earn about 19.6 percent above the market during the next 
three to five years while investment strategies in stocks with higher returns generate 
about 5 percent below the market returns in the subsequent three to five years. 
However, some subsequent studies (e.g., Chan [I9881 and Ball and Kothari 
[1989]) argue that the findings of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) might be explained by such 
factors as firm size, January effects, and/or temporal changes in risk factors. DeBondt and 
Thaler (1987) and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) reevaluate the evidence of the 
over-reaction effect in the context of these issues. DeBondt and Thaler (1987) show that 
their previous evidence is not attributed to firm-specific risk characteristics, size, or 
January effects. To examine whether the market over-reaction evidence documented by 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) can be explained by the methodological problems raised in 
the above studies, Chopra et al. (1992) use time-varying betas and shorter windows to 
measure abnormal returns while controlling for firm size and January effects. They 
conclude that there is strong evidence of market over-reactions and those temporal 
changes in risk factors, firm size, and the turn-of-the year (January) effects are unlikely to 
account for this result. As well, they find long-term losers outperform their cohort 
winners around the announcement dates of subsequent quarterly earnings and argue that 
this evidence is consistent with the market over-reaction hypothesis. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) report that past low performing firms, measured by their 
past growth in sales and earnings and cash flow relative to market prices, yield superior 
future returns compared to past high performing firms. They attribute their findings to 
systematic investor biases and argue that investors overweight a firm's past growth when 
predicting its future outlooks. This biased expectation drives market prices of high (low) 
growth firms above (below) their fundamental values; subsequently, these firms' shares 
earn lower (higher) future returns relative to the market. 
Using NYSE and AMEX firms from 1963 to 1990, La Porta et al. (1997) 
investigate whether greater stock returns achieved by value strategies are due to risk 
factors or investors' biased expectations. To classify firms into value and growth firms, 
they use different fundamentallprice measures, such as sales, earnings, and cash flow 
relative to market prices. Based on these accounting ratios over the last five years, they 
classify stocks into three groups: top 30, middle 40, and bottom 30 percentiles. They then 
examine the returns for these groups over the ensuing five years. Controlling for various 
risk factors, they show that value stocks outperform growth stock over the holding period 
by about 10 to 11 percent per year. They then examine the returns around the 
announcement periods of future quarterly earnings. They find a significant portion of the 
returns to value and growth stocks is concentrated arouiid the earnings announcement 
dates. They conclude that investors systematically exhibit biased expectations about 
future growtli of both value and growth stocks. Investors expect past financial 
performance of growth firms to persist but when their expectations are proven false, stock 
prices of these firms revert to their fundamental values, resulting in low returns. 
Conversely, investors underestimate the future growth of value stocks, driving their 
market price below their fundamentals; eventually, these stocks earn higher returns when 
their future performance beats expectations. 
La Porta (1 996) analyzes the return differentials between value and growth stocks 
in terms of future earnings growth rates forecasted by financial analysts from 1982 to 
1990. He argues that if investors over-react to stocks with high forecasted earnings 
growth, market prices would be driven above their fundamental values, and as a result, 
growth stocks should have low returns when their prices revert to value. On the other 
hand, stocks with low analysts' expected growth rates are more likely to be under-valued. 
Eventually, these stocks would exhibit higher returns. His findings indicate that firms 
with low expected earnings growth outperform those with high expected earnings growth 
by about 20 percent over the first year after the portfolio formation. The difference in 
returns between value and growth stocks continues through year five after the formatioil 
horizon. In the first year following the formation date, analysts drastically revise their 
earnings forecasts upward (downward) for value (growth) stocks. Additionally, he 
examines the return of value and growth stocks at the announcement dates of projected 
quarterly earnings. His evidence shows that firms with low predicted growth rates 
outperform the market around the announcement dates, while their counterpart firms with 
high expected earnings growth under-perform the market. He argues that his findings are 
not affected by firm size, booldmarket effects, as well as other potential risk exposures. 
In interpreting his overall evidence, he suggests that his findings provide strong support 
to the expectational error hypothesis. 
Studies investigating the returns to trading strategies formed based on some value 
metrics relative to market prices, such as booldmarket, fundamentallmarket measures, 
and other accounting variables, provide evidence that is consistent with a market over- 
reaction. For example, firms with high booldmarket (BIM) measures outperform their 
counterpart with low BIM ratios (e.g., Fama and French [1992, 19931). Some studies 
have linked the BIM ratio effect to risk exposures. Fama and French (1992, 1993) argue 
that firms with high B/M ratios are more likely to be financially distressed firms, and the 
higher returns on these stocks are rewards for more risk exposures. However, other 
empirical studies suggest that the B/M ratio effect is attributed to market mispricing. 
Dichev (1998) shows that there is no association between bankruptcy risk and future 
returns of high B/M firms. La Porta et al. (1997) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) examine 
the market reaction to the announcements of subsequent earnings for both value and 
growth firms. They find value stocks exhibit higher returns than their growth stock 
counterparts around the announcement dates. They find value firms outperform their 
growth firm counterparts around those dates. They argue that there is a systematic bias in 
the manner in which investors formulate their predictions about future earnings of these 
stocks. They further argue that the effect associated with high (low) B/M firms is due to 
investors' biased expectations about the future prospects of these firms rather than 
potential risk exposures. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that any market mispricing 
cannot be arbitraged away in a timely manner if arbitrage costs are greater than its profits. 
They then assert that arbitrage risk (the volatility of arbitrage returns) impedes 
arbitrageurs' trading activities, and it is more likely to be an important factor behind the 
persistence of the B/M effect. Ali et al. (2003) empirically examine Shleifer and Vishny's 
(1997) conjecture to determine whether the B/M effect is related to arbitrage risk or 
mispricing. They show that the effect of B/M firms is greater for stock with higher 
transaction costs, higher return volatility, and low investor sophistication. They conclude 
arbitrage risk exposures are not likely to be the source of abnormal returns achieved by 
high B/M firms as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
In recent years, several empirical studies (e.g., Frankel and Lee [I9981 and Lee et 
al. [I9991 have shown that the value-price ratio (VIP) predicts subsequent abnormal 
returns for horizons up to three years. Frankel and Lee (1998) form a trading strategy 
based on the valuelprice ratio (VIP) for each year from 1977 to 1992. The trading strategy 
takes long (short) positions in firms in the highest (lowest) VIP quintiles. They report that 
this investment strategy generate returns of 3.1, 15.2, and 30.6 percent over one, two, and 
three years, respectively, following the formation horizon. Lee et al. (1999) examine the 
time-series properties of VIP and its ability to predict expected returns compared to other 
fundamental measures. They find that VIP is a better predictor of future stock returns 
than other fundanlentallprice ratios. Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan [1999], Gode and 
Mohanram (2001), and Piotroski (2001) use different measures (historical earnings) to 
operatioiialize the residual-income model and reach similar conclusions to those of 
Frankel and Lee (1998) and Lee et al. (1999). 
Ali et al. (2003) address several concerns raised about whether the VIP effect is 
attributed to market mispricing or risk factors (e.g., Beaver [2002], Kothari [2001], and 
Lo and Lys [2000]). Using analyst earnings forecasts to operationalize the residual 
income model and data from 1976 to 1997, Ali et al. (2003) replicate the study of Frankel 
and Lee (1998), reporting similar findings to those of Frankel and Lee (1 998). The long- 
short portfolio of Ali et al. (2003) earns abnormal returns of 5.7, 15.5, and 31.1 percent 
over holding horizons of one, two and three years, respectively. They find that most of 
the VIP effect is concentrated around the announcements of subsequent earnings. They 
argue that this evidence is consistent with the market misvaluation explanation and this 
mispricing corrects itself when future earnings information becomes known. Even after 
controlling for an extensive set of proxies for risk factors (Gebhardt, Lee, and 
Swaminathan [2001], Gode and Mohanram [2001], and Ali et al. [2003]) find the VIP 
variable continues to have a strong association with future returns. They interpret their 
findings as supportive of mispricing explanations over risk-based explanations. 
Substituting actual realized earnings for analysts' earnings forecast in the residual-income 
model, Zhou (2002) shows that the predictive ability of VIP for future returns is superior 
to that of VIP ratios based on analysts' forecasts. 
Given the ability of VIP measures to predict subsequent stock returns over longer 
horizons, the argument related to growth and value firms can be extended to VIP firms. 
Firms with high VIP ratios can be characterized as value firms, while firms with low VIP 
ratios can be viewed as growth firms. High VIP stocks outperform their low VIP 
counterparts because the former are undervalued, and subsequently these stocks should 
earn excess returns when their performance beats market expectations. On the other hand, 
low VIP firms are overvalued because they are expected to perform well in the future. 
But when their future performance falls short of expectations, their market prices recover 
to their fundamentals, resulting in low returns. 
Chan et al. (2004) investigate investor over-reaction to high (low) past financial 
performance as measured by accounting variables, namely growth rates in sales, net 
income, and operating income. Using (quarterly data for one year) annual data for five 
years, they find no discernable evidence of price reversals over the following (12- 
months) 36-m0nths.~ They interpret their findings as evidence contrary to behavioral 
They find weak evidence of price momentum in first year, which they argue is subsumed by earnings drift 
effects. 
theories suggesting that patterns of firms' past financial performance may cause investor 
to form misperceptions about the future prospects of these firms. 
However, the findings of Chan et al. (2004) might be attributed to the following 
three issues. First, the holding horizon may not be long enough to capture long-horizon 
price reversals. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue that previous studies using shorter 
horizons than five years to examine stock return behavior have failed to capture the 
pattern of long-run return reversals. Other studies that examine the behavior of stock 
prices following high (low) historical performance measures provide evidence of post- 
formation price drifts for the first year and long horizon reversals in the third through the 
fifth years after the formation period (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler [1985, 19871 and 
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993,2001]). 
Second, Chan et al. (2004) calculate past growth rates in sales, net income, 
operating income as the difference between per share value of each measure at time t and 
per share values for these measures at time t-5 divided by sales per share as the deflator 
for sales growth and net asset per share as the deflator for both net income and operating 
income. This procedure may results in two potential biases: (1) growth rates in these 
variables are likely to be susceptible to extreme observations at both ends of the 
estimation period and (2) growth rates in net income and operating income scaled by net 
assets per share at time t-5 may not reflect market expectations if investors do not take 
asset growth into account when assessing a firm's growth. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue 
that a measure that captures investors' expectations about the future prospects of value 
firms should result in high returns for value investment strategies. Finally, when testing 
price reversals, Chan et al. (2004) regress raw returns of their portfolio on the three 
Fama-French factors after adding a fourth factor to account for the effects of rn0mentum.j 
These price-containing factors might proxy for mispricing rather than risk exposures 
(e.g., Hirslileifer [2001]). 
2.4 Conflicting Evidence of Investor Reactions to Past Financial 
Performance 
Early studies that examine market momentum effects and long horizon price 
reversals consider these two market regularities to be distinct and independent 
phenomena. This characterization of market under- and over-reactions is the commonly 
held point of view among researchers in this area. However, recent studies have provided 
mixed evidence about the link between under- and over-reaction effects. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (200 1) show that stocks with high (low) returns during the past six months exhibit 
price momentum over the next twelve months following the formation date. After the 
first year, however, prior losers outperform past winners. This pattern continues through 
the end of the fifth year after the portfolio formation. This evidence is similar to that 
documented in previous studies (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [I9931 and Lee and 
Swaminathan [2000]). 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) provide evidence that past winners continue to earn 
higher returns over three to twelve months subsequent to the formation date, but over 
longer horizons (three to five years), prior losers earn higher returns than past winners. 
For example, by the end of year five, almost the entire momentum gains (1 1.56 percent) 
over the first twelve months of the holding horizon have been offset by return reversals 
5 The three Fama-French factors: the market return risk-free rate (RM-RF), high B/M return-low B/M return 
(HML), and small firm return-big firm return (SMB). 
(10.95 percent) during the last two years of the holding period. They argue that market 
momentum is a result of market over-reaction to past performance that subsequently 
corrects itself when investors realize that their prior expectations were not accurate. They 
further argue that prior studies that use shorter holding horizons of up to three years have 
not captured these patterns of price momentum and subsequent reversal. The evidence 
that links price momentum and long horizon reversals is consistent with recent theoretical 
development (e.g., Daniel et al. [1998]). Daniel et al. characterize the market momentum 
and long-run return reversals as a manifestation of an investor over-reaction that leads to 
temporal momentum gains and subsequent price reversals when market prices converge 
to their fundamentals. 
On the other hand, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) argue that market momentum 
and price reversal effects do not suggest that these two phenomena are driven by the 
same investor sentiments. Rather, market under- and over-reactions seem to have evolved 
independently of each other. They then assert that .their findings cast doubt on recent 
theory suggesting that momentum and reversal effects are driven by the same forces. 
They conclude that if there is a link between the momentum profits and subsequent price 
reversals, it is certainly a weaker one because these two market regularities do not exhibit 
the same behavior. 
Whether the market momentum and long-run price reversal are driven by 
independent forces, as commonly believed, or both of these phenomena are products of a 
market over-reaction that eventually returns to fundamental values, the extensive body of 
evidence, reviewed in the preceding two subsections suggests that there are systematic 
investor biases that can be exploited for generating trading profits without bearing extra 
risk. However, Fama (1998) argues that the evidence on market under- and over-reactions 
is pure chance and it does not represent a departure from market efficiency because the 
frequency of price momentum and reversal effects is equally distributed. Conrad and 
Kaul (1998) argue that documented abnormal profits of price momentum and reversal 
trading strategies are attributed to the cross-sectional dispersion in average stock returns 
rather than to the time-series properties of historical returns. They argue that momentum 
and contrarian investment strategies that are formed based on unconditional patterns of 
past performance are equally profitable as those constructed on the basis of past 
performance measures. 
However, Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson (2002) assert that Fama's (1998) 
argument might be correct if market momentum and subsequent return reversals cannot 
be predicted. On the other hand, if circumstances exist in which these market regularities 
can be anticipated by rational investors and exploited to earn abnormal profits, then 
under-reaction and over-reaction effects do not square with the market models. The 
assertion of Conrad and Kaul (1998) is refuted by more recent studies (e.g., Grundy and 
Martin [2001] and Jegadeesh and Titman [2001,2002]). Grundy and Martin (2001), who 
analyze the sources of price momentum profits using data going back to 1920s, conclude 
that the momentum effect is neither due to the differences in the cross-sectional mean 
return as suggested by Conrad and Kaul (1998) nor to potential risk exposures. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001, 2002) examine the Conrad and Kaul (1998) conjecture. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2001) find stock returns of past winners (losers) continue to drift upward 
(downward) over the first twelve months after the formation horizon, but past losers 
outperform their winner counterparts thereafter through the five years following the 
portfolio formation. They reject the hypothesis of Conrad and Kaul (1998). Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2002) revisit this issue using similar methods used by Conrad and Kaul 
(1 998). They conclude that the variability of cross-sectional average stock returns is not 
the source for the profitability of price momentum strategies. They argue that the 
evidence reported by Conrad and Kaul(1998) is due to sample biases. 
With the mounting evidence challenging the standard market models, the 
behavioral finance models are increasingly gaining prominence as alternative 
explanations for the growing body of evidence on stock return predictability. However, 
before the behavioral based-models can develop a comprehensive theoretical framework 
that explains the mechanism of market prices and how they are affected by the behavior 
of market participants, behavioral theorists should come to terms with the following 
critical questions. First, what factors are more likely to influence investor expectations 
with respect to the future financial performance of a firm or group of firms? Second, does 
the interaction between these factors and their measurement horizons influence investor 
expectations? Third, are the documented price momentum and reversals distinct and 
independent phenomena or are both a manifestation of a market over-reaction that 
eventually recovers to the fundamentals as suggested by recent empirical and theoretical 
works (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Jegadeesh and Titman [2001], and Daniel et 
al. [1998])? Finally, if the market exhibits both under- and over-reaction as it is 
commonly believed, then what are the circumstances in which the market is expected to 
under-react or over-react? 
CHAPTER I11 
Theoretical Development and Research Hypotheses 
3.1 Investor Psychology-Based Theories 
Efficient market theory makes two strong predictions about the behavior of 
market prices and returns: observed market prices are equivalent to their fundamental 
values, and market returns cannot be predicted from publicly available information. 
Therefore, it follows that all stocks are properly priced and observed stock prices are 
equal to the present values of all expected future payments (e.g., dividends) based on the 
information set available at the valuation date (e.g., Fama [1965, 19911). 
However, an extensive body of literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests 
otherwise. Furthermore, Shiller (1 98 1, 2003) and Campbell and Sliiller (1 987, 1988) 
argue that stock prices deviate significantly and frequently from their fundamental values. 
With more empirical evidence of these market regularities, the behavioral finance models 
have emerged as a viable research alternative (Thaler, 1999). Lee (2001) concurs, stating 
that empirical evidence is increasingly consistent with this concept. He argues that 
market efficiency can be better characterized as a journey rather than a final destination. 
Market prices are continuously seeking their equilibrium through the interaction of 
imperfectly rational traders and well-informed arbi trage~rs.~ He argues that in this 
context, it is iiaTve and conceptually unsound to equate observed market prices with their 
fundamental values because such equality is a mischaracterization of the price discovery 
6 In equilibrium, market prices are a weighted average of investor beliefs and preferences and they are 
not necessarily equal to fundamental values. 
mechanism in which market prices converge toward fundamental values over time 
through the interplay of market forces. 
However, before the behavioral finance models become accepted as a competing 
paradigm explaining the market price formation process and how it is affected by the 
behavior of market participants, behavioral finance theorists should address several 
critical issues including: 
How do patterns of firms' historical measures affect investor expectations about 
firms' future performance prospects? 
Are market price momentum and reversal effects a product of the same investor 
psychology or are these market regularities driven by different factors? 
In recent years, several studies attempt to explain the nature and underlying 
causes of market under-reaction and over-reaction (e.g., Daniel et al. [1998], Barberis et 
al. [1998], and Hong and Stein [1999]). Barberis et al. (1998) offer an investor learning 
model based on two psychological concepts, representativeness heuristics and 
conservatism, to explain why a market under-reacts to information in some cases and 
over-reacts in others. In this model, firms' actual earnings follow a random walk, but 
investors believe that earnings switch between a continuing regime and a mean-reverting 
regime. Earnings changes are positively autocorrelated in the former and negatively 
autocorrelated in the latter. Investors use the historical behavior of a firm's earnings 
changes to predict its future earnings. Due to the representativeness heuristic bias, firms 
with consistent earnings growth (declines) in the past are believed to be in a continuing 
regime. By over-weighting the time-series properties of extreme financial performance 
when forecasting firms' future earnings, investors create a market over-reaction that 
subsequently reverts to the fundamentals leading to long-horizon price reversals. 
Alternatively, conservatism bias leads investors to mistakenly conclude that firms are in a 
reversion stage when current earnings change after several earnings reversals. As a 
result, new information is being slowly incorporated in market prices leading to a 
momentum effect. In short, investors under-react to earnings changes following a series 
of earnings reversals and over-react to earnings changes following a series of 
performance changes in the same direction. 
Daniel et al. (1998) focus on investors' overconfidence and self-attribution biases. 
Both concepts are based on experimental and survey evidence from the cognitive 
psychological literature. This literature suggests that people have an inclination to exhibit 
overconfidence in their skills, abilities, and knowledge, and this overconfidence is 
exacerbated when tasks are challenging and complex or when feedback is ui~clear or 
inconclusive (e.g., Trivers [1985, 199 11, Alpert and Raiffa [I 9821, and Fischhoff, Slovic, 
and Lichtenstein [19771).~ Daniel et al. (1998) argue that stock markets involve a high 
degree of uncertainty (e.g., forecasting future cash flows) and the feedback in such 
settings is often vague and untimely. They predict that overconfidence bias is more 
likely to be strong in stocks that are difficult to value (e.g., growth stocks). The cognitive 
psychology literature indicates that individuals are more likely to attribute success to their 
own superior qualities and failure to externalities. In the capital market context, Daniel et 
al. (1998) argue that investors learn about their abilities to identify winning stocks in a 
biased manner. Initially, investors observe fundamental signals about a set of stocks and 
subsequently receive information that either confirms or contradicts these signals. Due to 
Also, see Hirshleifer (2001) and Odean (1998) for reviews. 
their self-biased attribution, investors attribute favorable outcomes to their higher skills 
and adverse outcomes to bad luck. As a consequence, investors become overly confident 
of their stock-picking skills. This leads to further market over-reactions before stock 
prices eventually revert to fundamentals, resulting in long-run price reversals. 
Simultaneously, disconfirming events have little or no impact on their confidence level. 
Hong and Stein's (1999) study includes two groups of investors that have 
different biases: (1) news watchers or informed investors and (2) momentum traders or 
trend chasers. Both groups are risk averse and imperfectly rational because they fail to 
incorporate other sources of information into their decision-making processes. Informed 
investors base their trading activities on fundamental information about future payoffs, 
but ignore information from other sources (e.g., historical behavior of past price 
movements). On other hand, trend chasers form the bases for their trades on the behavior 
of past price changes. Trend chasing by momentum investors may initially improve 
market efficiency, but eventually market prices will be driven away from fundamentals 
when more trend chasers enter the market. Subsequently, this leads to long-term price 
reversals. 
The explanations of market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects 
provided by these models can be classified in two categories. Barberis et al. (1998) and 
Hong and Stein (1999) view price momentum and subsequent reversals as two distinct 
and independent market regularities. They see a price continuation as evidence of a 
market under-reaction and a long-run price reversal as a response to a market over- 
reaction. Their characterization of these phenomena is consistent with the widely held 
view among many researchers. According to Barberis et al.'s (1998) theory, the 
conservatism and representativeness heuristic biases are driving factors behind under- 
reaction and over-reaction effects, respectively. On the other hand, Hong and Stein 
theorize that the momentum returns and subsequent reversals is a result of slow diffusion 
of information across subgroups of investors. 
Contrary to Barberis et al. (1998) and Stein (1999), Daniel et al. (1 998) argue that, 
due to an overconfidence bias, investors over-react to information signals driving stock 
prices away from their fundamental values. This initial over-reaction is pushed even 
further as more signals confirm investors' previous actions, resulting in positive return 
drifts before prices eventually recover to fundamental values (long-term return reversals). 
This theory asserts that price momentum and subsequent reversals are manifestations of a 
market over-reaction that corrects itself over time as investors come to realize that their 
prior expectations have not materialized. This characterization of these phenomena is 
consistent with evidence from the cognitive psychology literature and related empirical 
~ t u d i e s . ~  Studies examining the behavior of stock returns following exceptional financial 
performance reveal that stock prices continue to move in the same direction over the first 
twelve months, but this pattern reverses at horizons of three-to-five years (e.g., DeBondt 
and Thaler [1985, 19871, Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011, and Lee and Swaminathan 
[2000]). 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
Classic economic models hold two assumptions about human behavior. 
Individuals have (1) infinite rationality and (2) infinite information processing capacities. 
8 Evidence on cognitive psycl~ology literature related to overconfidence and self-attribution biases is 
reviewed in subsection 3.2. 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964 and Lintner 1965), the efficient 
market hypothesis (Fama 1965), and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) (Ross 1976) are 
based on these two assumptions. The traditional market argument posits that, even if 
investors have judgment biases and errors, these biases and errors are independent across 
individuals. Thus, in market equilibrium, these human mistakes average out and should 
not influence market prices. However, theoretical and empirical work that is motivated by 
evidence on experimental psychological literature suggests that human biases are 
pervasive and no one seems to be immune to these biases. Hirshleifer (2001), Barberis et 
al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), La Porta et al. (1997), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993, 2001) argue that investors systematically hold biased expectations and their biases 
significantly affect market prices. Hirshleifer (2001) argues that due to limitations of 
time, information processing abilities, memory, attention, and other cognitive resource 
constraints, people use "heuristic simplification" to address complex decision problems. 
Because individuals have limited time and brainpower, they are not expected to tackle 
challenging problems optimally (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). 
Much of the research in decision-making and judgment bias stems from the work 
of experimental psychologists such as Tversky, Kahneman, and Simon. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) argue that individuals are inclined to classify things into discrete 
categories based on the degree to which these things share the salient cliaracteristics of 
their original populations. They suggest that individuals' judgments about forming 
categories are significantly influenced by past patterns and sequences of data even if 
these patterns and sequences represent a short period. 
Chan et al. (2004) argue that the representativeness heuristic of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1 974) underlies most behavioral theory that explains the behavior of market 
prices in terms of investor sentiments. Barberis et al. (1998) argue that, due to the 
representativeness heuristic bias, investors observing series of constant past positive 
(negative) earnings changes over sufficiently long periods tend to extend this pattern of 
past earnings changes into firms' future positive (negative) earnings prospects. They go 
on to argue that this extrapolation of the behavior of firms' past earnings growth to the 
future drives firms' stock prices away from their rational expected values. Subsequently, 
prices will revert to .their fundamentals, resulting in long run reversal. Consistent with the 
notion of the representativeness heuristic bias, Nissett and Wilson (1 977a) suggest that 
people are more likely to extend an outstanding characteristic they like about an 
individual to other attributes of this individual. As well, Lakonishok et al. (1994) and 
Shefrin and Statman (1995) argue that if investors erroneously extend their favorable 
evaluation of a firm's future earnings prospects to its expected stock returns, a firm's 
stock will be over-priced. 
In his theory of bounded rationality, Simon (1955) is among the first to point out 
the flawed premises of economic theories that describe economic agents as having 
infinite rationality and information processing capacity.9 He argues that the nature and 
complexity of economic decisions limit the abilities of individuals to make rational 
decisions. His argument is consistent with several well-known psychological biases that 
are posited to influence individual judgments and decision-making processes. Two of 
these are the overconfidence bias and self-attribution bias. These concepts have been 
9 According to Simon (1955), bounded rationality refers to the limitations of information processing ability 
and complexity of decision problems that prevent individual from making perfectly rational decisions. 
argued to significantly affect the way investors analyze, internalize, and institutionalize 
their abilities to arrive at appropriate investment decisions. It is acknowledged in the 
cognitive psychology literature that people are usually overconfident in their abilities, 
knowledge, and skills (see e.g., Trivers [1985, 19911, Alpert and Raiffa [1982], and 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein [1977], Hirshleifer [2001], and Odean [1998b]. 
In reviewing psychological evidence that underlies behavioral finance models, 
DeBondt and Thaler (1995) conclude that, with respect to individual judgments and 
decisions, the most robust findings in the psychological literature are that people are 
overconfident in their choices and actions. According to the self-deception theory 
(Trivers 199 I), individuals believe they are smarter, stronger, and better friends than they 
actually are. Taylor and Brown (1998) suggest that believing in oneself is a significant 
driver of higher performance and eventually leads to greater success, but heavily over- 
estimating one's qualities results in biased judgments. 
Several studies that review psychological evidence (e.g., Einhorn [1980], Odean 
[1998b], Daniel et al. [ 19981, and Hirshleifer [200 11) indicate that overconfidence bias 
becomes more severe when tasks at hand are difficult, when there is a significant time 
lapse between the accomplishment of the tasks and feedback, or when feedback is unclear 
or ambiguous. According to Daniel et al.'s (1998) theory, investors are inherently biased 
in the way they assess their ability to value and identify winning securities; they 
systematically view themselves as having better investment skills than they actually do. 
Thus, investors' overconfidence is predicted to be high anlong stocks that are difficult to 
value, such as those with widely varying historical financial performance. 
Overconfidence in capital market settings is not a phenomenon of inexperienced and 
naYve traders alone, but sophisticated investors as well, who may exhibit even greater 
overconfidence in their ability. Griffin and Tversky (1992) argue that in the stock market 
where returns predictability is low, professional investors are more likely to be 
overconfident in their expertise in market theories and models. 
The conventional wisdom is that we learn about our skills, abilities, and 
knowledge as well as the precision of our decisions by reflecting on our experience and 
observing the consequences of our actions. However, the literature on empirical 
psychology suggests that people update their prior beliefs in a biased manner. 
Experimental psychologists find that people are more likely to attribute success to their 
superior qualities and failure to bad luck or externalities over which they had no control 
(e.g., Miller and Ross [1975], Langer and Roth [1975], and Hastorf, Schneider, and 
Polifia [1970]). The attribution theory of Bem (1965) holds that individuals are prone to 
attribute outcomes that confirm their predictions to their personal abilities and outcomes 
that disagree with their expectations to chance. 
Evidence from the experimental psychological literature also reveals that 
individuals are more likely to recall information about their successes rather than their 
failures. Disposition effects predict that investors tend to sell their winning stocks too 
soon and hold onto their losers too long (Shefrin and Titman 1985), a finding confirmed 
by Odean (1998a). Odean (1998b) argues that, if investors judge their abilities to make 
good investment decisions based on their realized returns, their judgment would be 
upwardly biased because they realize few losses relative to gains. He argues that 
investors do not receive timely feedback about their losers compared to feedback about 
winners, and this contributes to self-attribution bias. Daniel et al. (1998) argue that due to 
self-attribution bias, events that support investor prior beliefs significantly increase their 
overconfidence bias, while events that contradict their prior beliefs have little or no 
impact on their self-confidence. According to their theory, overconfidence bias creates an 
environment conducive to market over-reaction. As well, the self-attribution bias leads to 
more market over-shooting before investors realize that their previous expectations were 
false. A number of empirical studies examining the behavior of market prices of value 
and growth stocks (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], La Porta et al. [1997], and La Porta 
[1996]) report evidence that lends support to the predictions of Daniel et al.'s theory. 
They argue that the lower future performance of growth stocks compared to the 
performance of value stocks is due to biased investor expectations. They further argue 
that investors excessively over-weight patterns of firms' past performance measures 
when forecasting firms' future performance prospects. Consequently, stock prices of 
growth (value) firms are more likely to rise above (below) their fundamental values, but 
when future outcomes become known, investors become disappointed (optimistic) and 
stock prices revert to their fundamentals. 
Odean (1998b) suggests that there are two other factors that may contribute to the 
overconfidence in the stock market: self-selection bias and survivorship bias. Odean 
(1998b) argues that individuals that tend be more overconfident in their abilities and 
skills than the rest of the population are more likely to participate in the markets. He also 
argues that survivorship bias may lead to financial markets controlled by overconfident 
investors since unsuccessful investors are more likely to drop out of the market while 
survivors become more overconfident and wealthy. 
Taken together, experimental and survey evidence from the cognitive 
psychological literature, as well as theories and empirical studies motivated by the 
theoretical research literature, strongly suggest that human judgment and decision making 
processes are inherently biased. The degree of bias in human judgment depends on the 
nature, context, and complexity of the decision problems. In capital market settings, 
investors are required to deal with highly speculative issues such as future cash flows and 
deciding which securities are more likely to have the highest expected returns. In such an 
environment, feedback in many cases is inconclusive and late. Daniel et al. (1998) argue 
that the conlplexity of investment decisions and the vagueness or lack of immediate 
feedback in stock market contexts facilitates the overconfidence bias which is extremely 
suggestive of a market over-reaction. They argue that the self-attribution bias may cause 
additional over-reactions as f ~ ~ t u r e  evidence confirms investor prior beliefs. 
According to the theory of Barberis et al. (1998), investors use the behavior of 
firms' earnings changes in the past to predict firms' future earnings performance. 
Barberis et al. (1998) argue that due to the representativeness heuristic bias, investors 
over-react to firms with steady historical earnings changes over sufficiently long 
horizons, driving stock prices of these firms away from their rationally expected values. 
Eventually, however, stock prices will revert to their fundamental values when the market 
determines that those prior expectations were incorrect. 
3.2.1 Investor Over-reactions to Growth in Past Firm Financial Performance 
The representativeness heuristic suggests that individuals tend to think in discrete 
and distinct categories (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Mullainathan (2001) argues that 
people are imperfectly rational because they think in completely distinct categories and 
give excessive weight to the most representative scenario while ignoring the most 
plausible alternative. Barberis et al.'s (1998) theory holds that, due to the 
representativeness heuristic bias, firms with a series of consecutive positive or negative 
earnings changes lead investors to form biased expectations about the future profitability 
of these firms. Accordingly, firms with high past financial growth tend to be over-priced 
and firms with low (decreasing or possibly negative) growth over the same period 
become under-priced. However, in time, stocks prices of these firms will revert to their 
fundamental values when investors' expectations are proven inaccurate. 
Chan et al. (2004) argue that if investors follow the representativeness heuristics 
approach when evaluating firms based on growth rates in their past performance 
measures, a firm is likely to be placed in one of the following group: high, low, or non- 
growing firms. Experimental psychology research suggests that salient and attention- 
grabbing information such as extreme clues that stand out in their context are more likely 
to be given more emphasis than abstract, statistical, and/or less relevant signals included 
in background data. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) consider an information signal to be 
salient if it has distinct characteristics that differentiate it in its context (e.g., background) 
or a past state. These outstanding attributes draw one's attention or create cues that 
facilitate recall. 
The above assertion is supported by evidence from the cognitive psychology 
literature on how individuals learn over time through observing stochastic variables that 
are functions of multiple cues (e.g., Kruschke and Johansen, 1999). This literature 
indicates that people fail to develop a comprehensive understanding of the associations 
between these variables and competing cues. As a consequence, effects of salient cues 
dominate effects of other cues. Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that new investments in 
mutual funds are more likely to flow into those that experienced outstanding financial 
performance relative to their peers in the recent past. This evidence indicates that 
investors extrapolate past growth into the future, although empirical studies suggest that 
there is little or no evidence that the high performance will persist. 
Chan et al. (2004) use trends and sequences in past financial measures, 
specifically sales, net income, and operating income, to operationalize the 
representativeness heuristic bias. They argue that these financial variables are credible 
means for testing the predictions of behavioral theories because these measures are both 
salient and readily available for a broad spectrum of market participants. They suggest 
that the recent catastrophic market reactions to fraudulent financial reports and 
disclosures underscore the importance and the salient features of accounting information. 
Drawing on the preceding arguments, the following hypotheses are presented in their 
alternate forms: 
Hypothesis 1: If relative high (low) past sales growth influences investor expectations 
about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with higher (lower: 
falling or possibly negative) past sales growth are more likely to be over-priced (under- 
priced) and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term. 
Hypothesis 2: Ifrelative high (low) past earnings growth influences investor expectations 
about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with higher (lower: 
falling or possibly negative) past earnings growth are more likely to be over-priced 
(under-priced) and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the 
long term. 
Hypothesis 3: I f  relative high (low) past cash jlow growth influences investor 
expectations about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with 
higher (lower: falling or possibly negative) past cash jlow growth are more likely to be 
over-priced (under-priced) and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns 
over the long term. 
Hypothesis 4: I f  relative high (low) past market returns influence investor expectations 
about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with higher (lower: 
falling or possibly negative) past returns are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced) 
and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term. 
3.2.2 Investor Over-reactions to Consistency in Past Firm Financial Performance 
Chan et al. (2004) suggest that patterns of past financial realizations are 
significant factors underlying most recent psychology-based theories. Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (2004) find consistency in past stock returns is a crucial determinant of 
momentum profitability. They report that consistently winning stocks outperform other 
stocks across all formation and holding horizons. In an experimental setting, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) observe that subjects given historical data and asked to form groups 
based on these data tend to place too much weight on the historical patterns of these data 
even if these patterns existed only for a short time. 
Daniel et al. (1998) argue that investors are overconfident in their ability to 
analyze financial data and identify profitable stocks; their overconfidence bias becomes 
even more severe for stocks whose values are difficult to determine such as those with 
consistently high (low) financial performance in the past. As well, they argue that due to 
the self-attribution bias, investors' overconfidence is dramatically boosted by favorable 
feedback but only marginally dampened by adverse outcomes. According to their theory, 
sufficiently high (low) financial measures facilitate an initial market over-reaction, and 
consistency in such measures is more likely to invite further over-reactions. Over the long 
term, however, stock prices will revert to their fundamentals as investors learn that their 
prior expectations did not materialize. The predictions of Daniel et al.'s theory are 
consistent with the evidence of the effects of price momentum and subsequent reversals 
effects documented by a number of studies that examine stock price movements 
following high (low) past returns (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Jegadeesh and 
Titman [1993, 20011). 
The representativeness heuristic bias theory suggests that individuals have a 
strong inclination to classify events into distinct and independent categories based on 
salient characteristics which these events share with their original population (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974). In so doing, however, individuals tend to overestimate the actual 
probability that a particular event does indeed belong in a certain population. At the same 
time, they underestimate that only a few events belong in this population. Barberis et al. 
(1998) argue that consistently high (low) firm historical performance measures over 
sufficiently long horizons lead investors to mistakenly conclude that these time-series 
properties of a firm's past realization are truly representative of the firm's future 
earnings. In an experimental capital market setting, Bloomfield and Hales (2002) test the 
predictions of Barberis et al. (1998) using MBA students. They report that their 
experiment's participants tend to believe that a firm's change in earnings is more likely to 
hold in the future unless it follows a significant number of reversals. They interpret their 
findings as indicative of a market over-reaction to patterns of a firm's historical financial 
performance. 
Chan et al. (2004) suggest that consistent patterns of financial performance over 
longer horizons should be more salient and increase investors' confidence leading to 
more definitive classifications of firms into distinct and discrete categories based on past 
performance. They argue that firms consistently achieving high (low) financial 
performance in the past should trigger stronger market over-reactions and, as a result, 
these firms should be mispriced; subsequently, they should experience low (high) returns. 
Barberis and Huang (2001) propose a model in which firms' discount rates are 
viewed as a function of their past performance. Consistent with prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky [1979, 19811, they model investors' utility as a product of prior 
gains and losses. Owners of consistently winning (losing) stocks have a higher (lower) 
utility, and they become less (more) concerned about future losses. Consequently, 
winning (losing) stocks are perceived as less (more) risky, and this translates into lower 
(higher) discount rates. Assuming firms are virtually identical in all respects except their 
perceived risk, higher or lower discount rates represent stock price divergence from 
fundamental values. 
To summarize, consistency of firms' financial performance measures in the past 
affects the formation and revision of investor expectations about firms' future 
performance prospects. Stocks prices of firms with consistently high (low) past 
performance are likely to rise above (below) their fundamentals, but eventually market 
prices of these stocks should converge to their fundamental values, resulting in lower 
(higher) future returns. These predictions are presented in the following testable alternate 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: I f  consistency of past sales growth influence investor expectations about 
a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high (low) 
past sales growth are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently, 
these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term. 
Hypothesis 6: If consistency of past earnings growth influence investor expectations 
about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high 
(low) past earnings growth are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and 
subsequently, these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term. 
Hypothesis 7: If consistency of past cash flow growth influence investor expectations 
about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high 
(low) past cash flow growth are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and 
subsequently, these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term. 
Hypothesis 8: If consistency ofpast market returns influence investor expectations about 
a firm 's future performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high (low) 
past returns are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently, these 
stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term. 
3.2.3 The Interaction between Consistency of Firms' Past Performance Variables and 
its Measurement Horizons 
Daniel et al. (1998) argue that investors are overconfident in their abilities and 
skills to identify winning stocks. They further assert this overconfidence bias becomes 
more severe in challenging tasks that involve high uncertainty such as forecasting future 
cash flows. Accordingly, this bias leads to a market over-reaction, particularly in stocks 
that are difficult to value such as those achieving consistently high (low) growth over 
sufficiently long periods. Their theory further predicts that, due to self-attribution bias, 
investors adjust their prior beliefs in a biased fashion. Favorable outcomes confirming 
investor prior beliefs significantly increase their overconfidence; adverse outcomes, on 
the other hand, have little or no effect on their self-confidence in their abilities. As a 
consequence, high (low) firm past performance measures should spark an initial market 
over-reaction, resulting in stock price divergence from fundamental values. This initial 
over-reaction will be followed by further over-reaction only as long as future outcomes 
confirm investor prior beliefs, causing stock prices to continue their drift away from their 
fundamental values. Eventually, market prices will revert to those fundamentals. Stocks 
with high (low) past realizations over longer horizons are more likely to exhibit stronger 
price momentum and subsequent reversals. 
Empirical studies investigating the returns to momentum trading strategies (e.g., 
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 200 11, Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt [1999], Grundy and Martin [2001], and Grinblatt and Moskowitz 120041) 
provide evidence that is consistent with the prediction of the behavioral theories (e.g., 
Daniel et al. [1998]). These studies find price momentum and subsequent reversal effects 
are strongly related to the magnitude of firms' past performance measures and their 
formation horizons. For example, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find that consistency 
in past performance is a significant determinant of expected cross-sectional returns, 
particularly in winning stocks. They show that consistent winners outperform other 
stocks across all formation horizons and other consistent winner stocks with comparable 
past returns, but for shorter periods. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find the magnitude of 
momentum gains and subsequent reversals are strongly associated with the length of the 
formation periods. 
The theory of Barberis et al. (1998) posits that investors, influenced by their 
representativeness heuristic bias, over-react to firms with consistent past earnings 
changes drifting in one direction. Observing these earnings patterns over sufficiently long 
periods, investors are more likely to believe that past firms' earnings behavior is 
representative of firms' future earnings prospects. In experimental settings using two 
groups of MBA students, Bloomfield and Hales (2002) test the predictions of Barberis et 
al.'s model. The results of their experiment indicate that investors are more likely to over- 
react to a recent earnings change unless the reversal rate of past earning changes is 
significantly high. 
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001) propose 
investor learning models in which patterns of historical financial measures interact with 
firms' discount rates by influencing investors' perceptions about firms' risk exposures. In 
this model, a series of high (low) realized past financial variables over longer periods is 
indicative of a lower (higher) risk factor. Barberis et al.'s (2001) model is based on two 
concepts: the loss aversion theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and the house money 
theory (Thaler and Johnson 1990). According to the loss aversion theory, people view the 
utility of wealth as a function of temporal changes (gains and losses) in wealth rather than 
the absolute level of wealth. As well, individuals exhibit greater sensitivity to losses than 
to gains. The house money .theory holds that the impact of losses on individuals' 
decisions depends on whether a current loss follows prior gains or losses. A loss 
subsequent to a series of gains has less of an effect compared to a loss .that follows a 
string of similar losses. Thaler and Johnson (1990) provide evidence that gamblers tend 
to be more risk tolerant after gains and more risk averse after losses. 
Barberis and Huang (2001) propose a model based on loss aversion and mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1985). They argue that discount rates are a function of firms' 
historical financial performance. Consistently winning firms over longer horizons are 
perceived to be less risky than their consistent loser counterparts; as a consequence, 
future cash flows of consistent winners (losers) are discounted at lower (higher) rates. 
This leads to market prices for consistently winning (losing) stocks that diverge further 
from their fundamental values, but eventually, stock prices will revert to their 
fbndamentals. This results in price momentum and subsequent reversals over long 
horizons. 
In short, the interaction between consistency of firms' historical performance and 
the formation periods over which past performance is measured are likely to affect 
investor expectations about firms' future performance prospects (e.g., Daniel et al. 
[1998]). The magnitude of price momentum and long-run reversals following high (low) 
past financial performance is expected to be a function of these patterns and formation 
horizons. In other words, firms with consistently high (low) historical financial 
performance measured over longer horizons are more likely to have stronger market 
momentum and reversal effects compared to those wit11 similar past measures, but for 
shorter periods. Thus, the following hypotheses are posited in their alternate forms: 
Hypothesis 9: Ifthe interaction between consistency offirms 'past  sales growth and their 
measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms 'future performance 
prospects, stocks of firms consistently achieving high (low) sales growth over a longer 
period will be signzficantly over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently, these stocks 
will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks offirms with high (low) past sales 
growth, but for a shorter horizon. 
Hypothesis 10: If the interaction between consistency ofjirms ' past earnings growth and 
their measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms' future 
performance prospects, stocks ofjirms consistently achieving high (low) earnings growth 
over a longer period will be signijicantly over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently, 
these stocks will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks ofjirms with high (low) 
past earnings growth, but for a shorter horizon. 
Hypothesis 11: Ifthe interaction between consistency offirms 'past cash flow growth and 
their measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms' future 
performance prospects, stocks of firms consistently achieving high (low) cash flow 
growth over a longer period will be signzficantly over-priced (under-priced), and 
subsequently, these stocks will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks ofjirms with 
high (low) past cashJlow growth, but for a shorter horizon. 
Hypothesis 12: If the interaction between consistency of Jirms ' past stock returns and 
their measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms' future 
performance prospects, stocks of j rms consistently achieving high (low) stock returns 
over a longer period will be significantly over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently, 
these stocks will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks offirms with high (low) 
stock returns, but for a shorter horizon. 
3.2.4 The Relation between Price Momentum and Long-term Reversal Effects 
Studies that examine the behavior of stock returns following high (low) realized 
past returns document that past winners continue to outperform past losers over the 
ensuing twelve months following the formation period. After the first year, however, 
losing stocks earn higher returns than winning stocks. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find 
stock prices of both winners and losers continue to drift over the next 12 months, but 
more than half of the momentum gains are dissipated over the second and third years 
following the portfolio formation. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) extend their previous 
analysis to 1998 using a holding period of 60 months after the formation date and report 
similar evidence. For instance, they report the momentum monthly return is negative, on 
average, for Month 13 through Month 60. 
The findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) are confirmed by other 
studies. For instance, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) provide evidence that past winning 
stocks continue to earn higher returns over three-to-twelve months but over three to five 
years past winners (losers) become future losers (winners). By the end of year five, the 
momentum gains over the first twelve months have been almost completely offset by 
stock return reversals during the last two years of the holding period. They argue that 
prior studies that use shorter holding horizons (up to three years) have not captured these 
patterns of market momentum and subsequent reversals. They argue their findings 
strongly refute the commonly held belief that market price momentum and subsequent 
reversals are distinct and independent phenomena, rather they are a result of investor 
over-reaction to historical performance measures that subsequently revert to their 
fundamental values as investors realize their prior expectations were false. 
The evidence provided by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2001) is consistent with the prediction of Daniel et al. (1998) that market 
momentum and reversal effects are manifestations of investor reaction. However, other 
recent studies (e.g., Grinblatt and Moskowitz [2004] and Chan [2003]) argue that their 
evidence lends support to the prevailing point of view, which maintains that new 
information is reflected in stock prices on a gradual basis. Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(2004), for example, argue that price continuations and long-run reversals appear to be 
driven by different and independent forces. Given this conflicting evidence, it is 
important to investigate whether the profitability of market momentum and subsequent 
return reversals are manifestations of a market over-reaction as suggested by behavioral 
models (e.g., Daniel et al. [1998]) and by empirical evidence (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan 
[2000], and Jegadeesh and Titman [2001]). 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue that if a market under-reacts, then new 
information will be gradually incorporated into stock market prices. But once this 
information is completely reflected in stock prices, expected stock returns cannot be 
predicted thereafter. They further argue that returns to momentum trading strategies 
based on realized past returns after the first twelve months should be zero. The 
momentum return following high (low) past financial performance will be eliminated 
over time by return reversals (Daniel et al. 1998). Therefore, if firms' price momentum 
following a period of remarkably high (low) past realizations is a product of investor 
over-reaction to outstanding past performance, the momentum returns and subsequent 
reversals are more likely to be negatively related but comparable in their magnitude. To 
test this prediction, the following hypotheses are stated in their alternate forms. 
Hypothesis 13: If the documented market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects 
are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past sales growth, 
momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower: falling or possibly negative) past sales 
growth will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the momentum 
horizon. 
Hypothesis 14: I f  the documented market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects 
are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past earnings 
growth, momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower: falling or possibly negative) 
past earnings growth will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the 
momentum horizon. 
Hypothesis 15: If the documented market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects 
are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past cash flow 
growth, momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower: falling or possibly negative) past 
cash flow growth will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the 
momentum horizon. 
Hypothesis 16: I f  the documented market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects 
are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past stock returns, 
momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower: falling or possibly negative) past returns 
will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the momentum horizon. 
CHAPTER IV 
Performance Variables and Sample 
4.1 Firm Performance Variables 
The theoretical work linking the relationships between a firm's past financial 
performance measures and its future stock returns to investor psychology have neither 
identified past financial variables likely to facilitate a market over-reaction nor 
determined the length of time required to trigger such an over-reaction. However, 
empirical studies investigating these outcomes use several measures of past performance. 
For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) used historical stock returns over the prior five 
years to classify a sample of firms as winners or losers. Lakonishok et al. (1994) classify 
their sample into growth and value firms based on their performance over the last five 
years as measured by earnings-to-price ratios, cash flow-to-price ratios, and sales growth. 
Chan et al. (2004) use changes in sales, and changes in net income and operating income 
to measure growth in past financial performance over two time periods (five years using 
annual data and one year using quarterly data). 
4.2 Variable Measurements 
For this study, a firm's past financial performance is measured as changes in each 
of the following variables: sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns. Chan et al. 
(2004).suggest that sales may have little or no relation to a firm's profitability. If a firm's 
profitability is a significant driving factor of investors' decisions, earnings could be a 
better measure to capture investor expectations. Two measures of earnings are used in 
this study: operating earnings after depreciation and amortization expense (OE) and 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (EB). Some may argue 
that even earnings may not be a good measure for a firm's profitability since it includes 
non-cash flow items. If investors discount non-cash flow amounts in their investment 
decision-making processes, cash flow might be a more appropriate measure than earnings 
to assess a firm's value. To measure a firm's cash flow, two metrics that have been used 
extensively in the finance and accounting literatures will be used for this study. The first 
is earnings before extraordinary items and discoi~tinued operation plus deprecation (CF), 
which is cash flow as defined in the finance literature. The second is operating cash flow 
adjusted for depreciation and working capital accruals (ACF), which is cash flow as 
measured in the accounting literature. Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2004) argue 
that cash flow (i.e., earnings plus depreciation) is inadequate because it does not take into 
account other significant accrual items that affect a firm's operating cash flow such as 
working capital accruals. They further argue that a measure of operating cash flows 
including earnings adjusted for depreciation working capital accruals is a more 
comprehensive measure of a firm's operating cash flow. 
All firms on the COMPUSTAT annual files with data available on these measures 
for the period 1983-1999 are used to calculate prior growth in these performance 
variables over varying time intervals.1° Past growth rates in sales, earnings, and cash 
flow are computed by tracking per share year-to-year changes in these variables scaled by 
the average per share lagged values in the prior two years for each measure. Then the 
geometric means for each measure is computed over the time interval comprising the 
measurement horizon." For example, the annual growth rate in sales per share for firm j 
over the last five years prior to portfolio formation horizon is computed as follows: 
where SGjt is the annual geometric mean of growth rate in sales per share for firm j over 
the estimation intervals, ranging from one to five years relative to portfolio formation 
10 Summary statistics of firms with available data on past performance measures are presented in Table 1 ,  
Panel A. 
I '  Growth rates for each measure are winsorized to the 99.5 percent and 0.5 percent values to mitigate the 
influence of outlier observations. 
date t, ASPSj, is year-to-year changes in sales per share (SPS) for firm j in year z scaled 
by the average SPS lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1. 
The same procedure is followed to calculate annual growth rates in earnings and 
cash flows over various formation periods.'2 Because some firms report negative earnings 
and negative cash flow, growth rates in these variables may not produce meaningful 
performance metrics. To overcome this problem, Chan et al. (2004) scaled changes per 
share in net income and operating income by assets per share for the base period. 
However, using assets as deflators may significantly reduce the informativeness of these 
measures if investors simply compare financial growth rates in these variables across 
time without considering contemporaneous growth rates in assets (Chan et al., 2003). To 
avoid this potential problem, the absolute value of the average earnings and cash flow per 
shares are used as deflators.I3 
In addition, past stock returns are used as a measure of a firm's historical financial 
performance. Numerous empirical studies (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler [1985, 19871, 
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011, Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Grundy and Martin 
[2001], and Grinblatt and Moskowitz [2004]) find realized past stock returns predict 
subsequent stock market returns. However, none of these studies examine whether 
patterns of the behavior of past price movement over a longer horizon has an impact on 
future stock returns. Thus, past stock return is included as a measure of a firm's historical 
performance. The annual stock return over a range of estimation intervals from one to 
I* The computation of annual growth rates in these performance variables is illustrated in Appendix A. 
l 3  Due to extremely rare but substantially large increases or decreases in EPS before extraordinary items 
(EB), the annual growth in this measure is deleted if it is greater than 6 in absolute value and EPS for the 
current and prior one period, (i.e., EPSt and EPSt-I), have opposite signs. This procedure is to mitigate the 
impact of this statistical noise on the computation of EBG. This method is similar to that used in Morck et 
al. [1999]. 
five years prior to portfolio formation date is calculated as the geometric average monthly 
returns for 12-month periods. 
4.3 Growth and Consistency in Past Firm Performance Measures 
4.3.1 Growth in Past Firm Performance Measures 
A procedure similar to that used by Chan et al. (2004) is used to determine growth 
in annual performance measures. Each year at the end of December, firms are sorted by 
their past growth rates on each performance variable. On the basis of this ranking, firms 
are assigned into deciles (P 1 -P 10). P 10 includes the 10 percent of firms with the highest 
growth rate, and P1 contains the 10 percent of firms with the lowest growth rate. Firms 
in the top deciles (P10) are classified as "high-growth firms" and firms in the bottom 
deciles (PI) are called "low-growth firms." 
4.3.2 Consistency in Past Firm Performance Measures 
Consistency in a firm's past financial performance is defined as the number of 
years in which the firm maintains annual growth rates that will place it in the top 
(bottom) 40 percent for a given performance measure compared to other firms available 
in the respective year. This method is similar to that used in Chan et al. (2004). Each 
year at the end of December, firms are sorted independently by growth rates in their 
performance over the previous one to four years.'4 o n  the basis of this sorting, firms are 
assigned to 3 growth groups (top 40 percent, middle 20 percent, and bottom 40 percent). 
'"here were not enough observations for the 5-year-estimation interval. 
The top 40 percent of firms wit11 the highest growth rate are referred to as high growth 
firms and the bottom 40 percent of firms with the lowest growth rate are referred to as the 
low growth firms. 
Firms in the high-growth group that rank in the top 40 percent each year for all 
years included in a single estimation interval are defined as "consistent high-growth 
firms. " Alternatively, firms in this category that fail to meet these criteria are deemed 
"inconsistent high-growth firms. " Similarly, firms in the low growth group that 
consistently rank in the bottom 40 percent each year for the entire estimation period are 
classified as "consistent low-growth jrms. " Firms in low growth firms failing to satisfy 
consistency rules are deemed "inconsistent low-growth Jirms. " To assess the effect of 
consistency of past financial growth on investors' expectations, firms in the highest and 
lowest one-year-40 percent are used as benchmarks. 
4.4 Data Sources 
The sample used in this study consists of all firms publicly traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges over from 1983 to 1999 that have available data on the 
COMPUSTAT annual file and CRSP database. For a firm to be included, it must have 
sufficient data to calculate growth rates in at least one measure of variables used in this 
study (e.g., sales, earnings, cash flow, and past stock returns) during various estimation 
intervals varying from one to five years prior to portfolio formation. Because portfolios 
considered in this study have estimation intervals ranging from one to five years prior to 
formation horizon, the first holding periods begins in January 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
and 1988 for these measurement intervals. As well, the empirical tests require future 
stock returns for five years following portfolio formation. Therefore, January 1999 is the 
last formation horizon for all portfolios. 
Past sales growth (SG) is measured as annual growth in sales (Compustat item 
#12). Operating earnings (Compustat item # 13) minus depreciation and amortization 
expense (Compustat item #14) and earnings before extraordinary and discontinued 
operations (Compustat item #18) are used to measure past operating earnings growth 
rates (OEG) and growth rates in earnings before extraordinary items (EBG), respectively. 
Historical cash flow growth rates (CFG) as defined in the finance literature are computed 
using earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat item 
# 18) plus depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat item # 14). Similarly, 
earnings before extraordinary items adjusted for working capital accruals and 
depreciation and amortization expense is employed to calculate cash flow growth rates 
(ACFG) as defined in the accounting literature. 
As in Sloan (1996) and Desai et al. (2004), working capital accruals are computed 
using change in current assets (Compustat item #4), change in cash and cash equivalents 
(Compustat item #I), change in short-term liabilities (Compustat item #5) ,  change in debt 
included in short-term liabilities (Compustat item #34), change in income taxes payable 
(Compustat item #7 I), and depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat item #14). 
Accruals are divided by average total assets (Compustat item #6).15 Annual past stock 
returns (PRET) are computed using monthly stock prices over various estimation 
horizons ranging from one to five years prior to portfolio formation date. 
I 5  Data required for calculating accruals are not available for banks, insurance companies, and most 
financial firms (e.g., Sloan [I9961 and Desai et al. [2004]); thus, these firms are deleted. 
The book-to market ratio (BIM) is calculated as the ratio of book value of equity 
capital (Compustat item #60) to the market value of equity capital at the fiscal year-end 
prior to portfolio formation date. Market value of equity is the number of comnlon share 
outstanding multiplied by stock prices at the fiscal year-end before portfolios are formed. 
Monthly stock prices, returns, and shares outstanding are extracted from the Center for 
Research in Security and Prices (CRSP) database. As in similar research, (e.g., 
Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]), stocks with market prices 
below $1 at portfolio formation date are eliminated.16 
CHAPTER V 
Empirical Test Design 
The hypotheses posited in this study predict that performance growth and its 
persistence over time (consistency) represent patterns of past financial variables that are 
most likely to lead to a market over-reaction. As a result, stock prices of firms with 
relatively high (low) performance in the past are expected to be pushed above (below) 
their fundamental values. Eventually, however, share prices of these firms will return to 
their fundamental values. This stock price behavior is consistent with empirical research 
on market momentum and subsequent reversal effects. This study predicts that the 
interaction between patterns of past performance variables and their measurement 
horizons influence investor expectations. Specifically, return momentum and subsequent 
l 6  Stocks whose market prices are greater than $500 at the portfolio formation date are also deleted. 
reversals are more likely to be stronger among firms consistently performing well 
(poorly) over a longer period of time. Finally, consistent with recent theoretical and 
empirical work, the last set of hypotheses posed in this thesis argues that the documented 
price continuation and long-run price reversals are a manifestation of a market over- 
reaction. Various portfolio tests, including individual stock and hedge portfolios, are used 
to test these sets of hypotheses. Regression analyses are used, in which a firm's annual 
returns are regressed against its past performance variables after controlling for potential 
confounding factors. In the following sections, the implementation of these tests is 
described. 
5.1 Portfolio Tests 
The sets of hypotheses posited in this study argue that if investors over-react to 
past performance measures, patterns (growth and consistency in growth) of growth rates 
in these variables should be informative ex ante about future investor behavior. 
Accordingly, firms achieving relatively strong (weak) financial performance in the past 
are more likely to be perceived by investors as growing (declining) firms. As a 
consequence, stocks of these firms become over-priced (under-priced) and this 
mispricing is expected to continue to drift until adverse (favorable) information about 
firms' future performance become known to market participants. As investors receive 
more information refuting their prior expectations, stock prices move toward their 
fundamental values. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the behavior of stock returns over longer 
horizons following portfolio formation to determine whether this behavior is consistent 
with the hypothesis that investor expectations are biased. From previous empirical 
studies, it can be argued that the period of study must be long enough to capture the 
process of over-reaction and correction phases (e.g., Lee and Swaniinathan [2000] and 
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993,2001]). 
To facilitate such an examination, various equally weighted portfolios are formed 
following each pattern of firms' historical performance. These portfolios are held without 
rebalancing for five years after the formation date and their post-formation returns are 
calculated each year (years 1 through 5) as the geometric mean monthly returns. Portfolio 
formation and procedures used to measure their returns are described below. 
To test the sets of hypotheses advanced in this study, firms are grouped into ten 
decile portfolios (PI-PI 0) each year at .the end of December based on the ranking rules 
described in Chapter 4. The top ten percent of firms with the highest growth rates are 
included in P10 and the bottom ten percent of firms with the lowest growth rates are 
assigned to PI.  Next, trading strategies are applied whereby stocks of firms in the lowest 
growth decile (PI) are bought, and stocks of firms in the highest growth decile (P10) are 
sold. These strategies are applied for each performance measure. These portfolios are 
referred to as "growth portfolios" and their returns as "PI-P10." The predictions of H1- 
H4 are supported if PI-P10 is significantly greater than zero, particularly in years 2 
through 3 of the holding period.'7 
To test H5-H8, consistency in growth rates of firms' historical performance 
measures (sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns) is used to construct a portfolio 
17 The extant literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011) suggests that following relatively high 
(low) financial performance, stock prices continue to drift in the same direction for the next twelve months, 
but this momentum reverses over the long term. 
that takes a long position in consistent low-growth firms and a short position in consistent 
high-growth firms. These trading strategies are called "consistent-growth portfolios" and 
their returns are "CLG-CHG." The predictions of H5-H8 are supported if CLG-CHG is 
significantly greater than zero. Analogously, hypotheses H9-H12 are supported if 
consistent-growth portfolios with longer formation intervals, i.e., two to four years, earn 
significantly greater returns compared to benchmark portfolios. To test the predictions 
posited by H 13-H 16, returns of growth portfolio (P 1 -P 10) in the first post-formation year 
are compared to its returns in years 2 through 5 of the holding period. H13-H16 are 
supported if the one-year-ahead return to the PI-PI0 is offset by subsequent price 
reversals over the remainder of the investment horizons in year two through year five. 
All portfolios are held without rebalancing for five years after the formation date. 
If a firm's stock returns are missing from the CRSP database during a given year, the 
average return of the size-decile portfolio to which the firm belongs at the formation date 
is substituted for the firm's stock returns until the end of the year. The annual returns and 
size-adjusted abnormal returns (SAR) for years 1 through 5 are calculated as the 
geometric average monthly returns for five 12-month periods after the portfolio 
formation horizon. SAR is defined as the return for firm j minus the average return of the 
size decile portfolio to which firm j belongs at the beginning of the holding period. In 
calculating annual returns and SAR, each year is treated as one observation to avoid 
potential serial correlation in stock returns caused by overlapping holding horizons. The 
mean returns and mean-size-adjusted abnormal returns for each portfolio are averaged 
over the test period and t-tests are performed as in Fama-MacBeth (1973). 
To construct the size decile portfolios, all sample firms are ranked by size as 
measured by market capitalizations at the year-end of the fiscal year before portfolios are 
formed. Second, firms are assigned to ten size decile portfolios (P 1 -P 1 O), where P 10 and 
P1 contain firms in the top and bottom deciles of market capitalizations, respectively. If a 
firm disappears in a given period, the average return of the size decile portfolio to which 
the firm belongs is substituted for its returns until the end of the year, as in Lakonishok et 
al. (1994). 
5.2 Regression Tests 
The psychology-based theories reviewed in Chapter 3 suggests that patterns of a 
firm's past performance measures are significant driving factors behind the documented 
relation between expected returns and past performance variables. To investigate the 
marginal impact of these patterns on future stock returns, the following multiple cross- 
sectional regressions in which the independent variable is the past performance measure 
are run. In each regression, the size-adjusted abnormal return (SAR) for each firm is 
regressed against its past performance measures after controlling for its market beta and 
BIM ratio for each post-formation year (years 1 through 5).18 
where SARjT is the annual size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j for each year (years 1 
through 5) subsequent to the portfolio formation (z = 1, 2, . . .5). Qjt is the appropriate past 
18 Growth rates in performance variables are highly related, particularly, earnings and cash flow; thus, they 
are considered individually to avoid potential multicollinearity (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994]). 
financial performance measure (growth in sales, earnings, cash flow, or past stock 
returns), BetajT-l is the market beta for firm j computed using monthly returns for the prior 
60 months (with a minimum of 36 months) ending in December of year z-1. Ln(Size, ,-,) 
is the natural log of market value for equity of firm j at the end of December of year z-1, 
and B/MjT-, is the book value of equity divided by firm size at the end of the fiscal year 
z-1. Although SAR is used as the dependent variable in the regression approach, size 
ranks are included in the multiple regressions to avoid biased coefficients on past 
performance measures (e.g., Bernard [1987], Foster et al. [1984], and Desai et al. [2004]). 
The regression analyses assume linearity in the relation between the dependent 
and explanatory variables; this may not hold. Thus, the analyses may fail to capture the 
extent of the relation between a firm's past performance measures and its expected 
subsequent stock returns. To mitigate this problem, Bernard and Thomas (1990), Frankel 
and Lee (1998), Zhou (2002), and Desai et al. (2004) used scaled rankings of all 
independent variables. They argue that scaled rankings reduce the influence of outliers 
and alleviate the possibility of nonlinearity between the dependent and independent 
variables. As in Bernard and Thomas (1 990), Dechow and Sloan (1997), Frankel and Lee 
(1998), Zhou (2002), and Desai et al. (2004) all independent variables are sorted in ten 
deciles (0-9) in descending order. Each decile is scaled to a value of 0 (for the lowest 
decile) or 1 (for the highest decile). 
If patterns of a firm's past financial performance influence investor perceptions 
about its future prospects, its stock price may continue to move in .the same direction 
indicated by its past performance measures over the first year after portfolio formation. 
Over a longer horizon (perhaps three to five years), however, stock prices should revert to 
their fundamental values as investors are disappointed (surprised) by the actual 
performance of the firm. Thus, the coefficient P I  of 0, (past performance measures) might 
be positive and significant in the first post-formation year but negative and significant 
thereafter, particularly in years 3 through 5. For each of the five post-formation years, the 
coefficients from these cross-sectional regressions of stock returns are averaged over the 
sample period and t-statistics are calculated from the time-series variations of these 
regression coefficients as in Fama-MacBeth (1 973). 
Daniel et al. (1998) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue that the profitability 
of market momentum is a manifestation of a market over-reaction to the historical 
behavior of a firm's financial performance that eventually dissipates when its market 
price reverts to its fundamental value over the long run. This theoretical framework 
suggests that the behavior of stock prices during the momentum and reversal horizons is 
diametrically opposed to each other. To assess the association between the intermediate 
price continuation and the subsequent price reversal over longer time horizons, the cross- 
sectional regression (Eq. 1) is re-run including a firm's size-adjusted abnormal return 
(SARI) for the first post-formation year (the momentum return) as an independent 
variable. The dependent variable is the size-adjusted abnormal return (SAR) for firm j 
after the first twelve month of the holding period, starting with year 2 and ending with 
year 5. 
where SAR,, is the annual size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j in years 2 through 5 
following the formation date. SARjl is the one-year-ahead abnormal return for firm j after 
portfolio formation horizon, and the remainders of the variables are as defined 
previously. If the momentum profit is due to market over-reaction, the coefficient for 
SAR,, is expected to be significantly less than zero. 
CHAPTER VI 
Empirical Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 includes summary statistics of portfolio sample sizes and correlations 
among the variables. Firms with sufficient data on the Compustat annual files and CRSP 
to calculate growth rates in sales, earnings, cash flow, past stock returns are reported in 
Panel A. As shown in Panel A, the sample includes roughly equal observations for all 
measures across estimation intervals with the exception of ACFG, which has slightly 
fewer firms (firms with insufficient data to calculate working capital accruals, such as 
banks, insurance companies, and most financial firms were excluded as in Sloan (1996)). 
The average correlation coefficients among performance variables, market betas 
(Betas), book-to-market ratio (BIM), and market capitalizations (Size) are reported in 
Panel B, where Spearman (Pearson) correlations are in the upper (lower) diagonal. All 
performance measures are positively related suggesting that growth rates in these 
variables tend to move in the same direction. For example, OEG is highly correlated with 
EBG and CFG (Spearman correlations = 0.91, p < 0.0001, and 0.88, p < 0.0002, 
respectively). CFG is highly correlated with ACFG (Spearman correlation = 0.87, p = 
0.0003). Past performance variables exhibit positive associations with Size indicating that 
large firms have relatively higher past growth rates compared to their smaller 
counterparts. Finally, the correlations between growth in past performance measures and 
Betas and B/M ratios are negative although none of these coefficients are statistically 
significant except for PRET. 
[Table 11 
Descriptive statistics of firms in the top (bottom) growth decile portfolios (i.e., 
PI0 (P 1)) as well as all firms across the ten growth deciles for each performance measure 
appear in Panels A through C of Table 2 by estimation intervals of performance 
variables.19 Generally, with the exception of firms sorted based on SG and to some 
degree firms ranked by their PRET, firms in the highest (lowest) growth decile portfolios, 
P10 (PI) are typically smaller firms with relatively larger Betas compared to total firms. 
However, firms in the bottom growth portfolios (Pl) tend to have slightly higher B/M 
ratios and are smaller relative to firms in the top growth deciles (PIO). The dispersion in 
market capitalizations becomes more pronounced as the estimation interval increases. 
[Table 21 
Summary statistics of firms sorted by consistency in their growth rates are shown 
in Table 3.20 Table 3 shows the number of observations between low-growth and high- 
growth groups is approximately equal, particularly for the first two years of prior data 
(Panels A and B). Afterward, however, the low-growth group tends to have smaller 
19 Unreported statistics for firms in the 2nd and 4th estimation intervals exhibit similar patterns 
20 Unreported statistics for firms in the 3'd estimation interval show similar patterns. 
numbers of observations relative to their high-growth firm counterpart. This might be due 
to the fact that firms consistently ranking in the lowest 4.0 percent for a longer horizon are 
likely to be de-listed or acquired by other firms. In general, with the exception of firms 
sorted by SG and PRET, both consistent high-growth firms and consistent-low-growth 
firms are relatively small firms and both groups are comparable in terms of market 
values. 
[Table 31 
6.2 Portfolio Test Results 
6.2.1 Growth Portfolios 
In this subsection, results for various growth portfolios formed based on past 
growth rates in sales, earnings, cash flow, and returns are reported. For all growth 
metrics, only results for top (P10) and bottom (PI) portfolios, and their return 
differentials, i.e., PI-P10, are reported in Tables 4 through 9.2' Tables 4 through 9 include 
annual returns and size-adjusted abnormal returns along with estimation periods. Treating 
each post-formation year as an independent observation to avoid potential serial 
correlation, five annual returns (R1 through R5) and size-adjusted abnormal returns 
(SARI through SAR5) for each estimation period are calculated. As well, the arithmetic 
average annual returns (AR) and average size-adjusted abnormal returns (ASAR) over 
the test period (years 1 through 5) are calculated to facilitate comparison with prior 
studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994]). 
- 
2 1 Unreported performance based on the 2"d and 31d estimation intervals reveals similar patterns to reported 
results. 
Results from growth portfolios based on SG are reported in Table 4. The results 
indicate that low growth firms (PI) earn relatively higher returns compared to high 
growth firm portfolios (PI O), particularly for the first two years after portfolio formation 
date. For example, the spread for returns between the top and bottom portfolios, that is, 
P 1-P10, for the first-postformation year is 5.29 percent for five-year growth rates in sales 
(Panel C under the Year 1/R1 column) and 10.33 percent for the last three year estimation 
period (Panel B under the Year 1 IR1 column). The average returns for P 1 -P 10, however, 
over the holding period are not different from zero beyond the third estimation interval. 
For instance, as shown in Panel C, Table 4 under the AverageIAR column, the PI -PI0 
average return for the five-year formation period is 0.71 percent (t = 0.65). This finding is 
inconsistent with that of Lakonishok et al. (1994), who report an average return of 6.8 
percent per year for the P 1 -P 10 portfolio in their sample. 
[Table 41 
The difference between the results reported in this thesis and those of Lakonishok 
et al. (1994) might be attributed to the following reasons: Lakonishok et al.'s study uses 
only NYSE and AMEX from 1968 to 1990 while my sample includes NASDAQ firms as 
well during the 1987 to 1999 time interval. Desai et al. (2004), include NASDAQ firms 
in their sample, and obtain a return gap between value and growth of 10.2, 0.20, and 0.80 
percent, for one-, two-, and three-years ahead, respectively. Their results suggest that the 
effect of past sales growth completely disappears after the first year. 
Returns to portfolios sorted on the basis of past growth rates in OEG are presented 
in Table 5. Regardless of the formation intervals, based on the average annual returns 
over the 5 year holding periods, firms in the bottom growth decile (PI) substantially 
outperform firms with the higher past growth rates (P10). The P1 portfolio yields an 
average annual return of between 25.33 (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) and 
3 1.67 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column) for one and five year estimation 
horizons, respectively. On other hand, their cohort firms in the top growth portfolios 
(P10) earn an average return ranging from 20.87 percent (Panel A under the AverageIAR 
column) to 18.50 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This results in an 
annual return spread between 4.46 percent (t = 4.10) as shown in Panel A under the 
AverageIRA column and 13.67 percent (t = 5.33) as shown in Panel C under the 
AverageIAR column. As well, the results reported in Table 5 show that the difference in 
returns between the top and bottom growth portfolios increases uniformly as more years 
of past performance data are included in the analysis. 
[Table 51 
For PI-P10, the portfolio going long (short) in stocks ranking lowest (highest) in 
earnings growth rates over the prior five years, an average abnormal return of 8.38 
percent (t = 5.07) per year over the five-year holding horizon is observed (see Panel C 
under the AverageIASAR column). This finding contradicts that of Chan et al. (2004), 
who show no evidence of return reversal over the next 36-months after the formation 
period. However, this result is consistent with that reported in Lakonishok et al. (1994). 
For the one-year estimation interval, the high-growth portfolio (P 10) outperforms 
the low-growth portfolio (PI) by a return of 6.40 percent (t = 1.85) and size-adjusted 
abnormal return of 7.26 percent (t = 2.33) in the first post-formation year (see panel A of 
Table 5 under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns, respectively). This evidence is 
consistent with the presence of a "jinancial momentum" effect. This effect seems to 
persist even in portfolios formed based on longer estimation intervals, but its strength and 
persistence dissipates quickly as more years of data are included in the formation interval. 
For example, the first year return to the PI-PI0 portfolio for two through five year 
estimation horizons is always positive. However, the existence of financial momentum 
can be inferred from the smaller magnitude of first year return to the P 1 -P 10 portfolio 
compared to its returns in years 2 through 5 for all estimation intervals graphically 
presented in Figure 1. As well, the size-adjusted abnormal returns exhibit similar 
patterns. 
[Figure 11 
The results reported in Table 5 show returns of -6.40 percent (t = -1.85) and -7.26 
percent (t = -2.33) for raw and size-adjusted returns (see Panel A under the Year 1/R1 
and SARl columns), respectively, for the portfolio that buys (sells) stocks of firms 
ranking lowest (highest) in past operating earnings growth rates in the year preceding the 
portfolio formation date. This indicates a stronger price drift following exceptionally high 
(low) operating earnings growth than that documented by Chan et al. (2004). They find 
firms with high operating income over the prior one year outperform firms in the bottom 
decile, but by the end of twelve months, the return spread between high- and low-growth 
stock portfolios are not significantly different from zero. They report similar evidence for 
net income. 
Results for firms sorted by their past growth rates in EBG over formation periods 
between one and five years are presented in Table 6. On average, firms ranking lowest 
(highest) in past growth rates generate average annual returns between 24.19 percent 
(19.99 percent) as shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column and 29.05 percent 
(17.78 percent) as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column for the one and five 
year estimation horizons, respectively. Returns for low (high) growth deciles exhibit the 
same uniform pattern of steady increase (decrease) with the estimation durations. This 
gives rise to an average annual return for the PI-PI0 portfolio varying from 4.20 percent 
(t = 4.36) as shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column to 11.27 percent (t = 7.17) 
as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column for one and five years of past growth 
in EBG, respectively. The same pattern emerges for the size-adjusted returns. This 
evidence is consistent with Lakonishok et al. (1994). 
[Table 61 
As in Table 5, we see that firms with one-year growth rates in the top growth 
decile (P10) earn substantially higher returns (6.56 percent; t = 2.48) and size-adjusted 
returns (7.24 percent; t = 2.93) than their low growth firm counterparts (Pl) in year l (  see 
Panel A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns, respectively). This evidence is 
consistent with the presence of financial momentum following strong (weak) financial 
performance. The PI-PI0 return behavior in the first post-formation year across all 
estimation horizons reveals a price drift after relatively high (low) financial growth. This 
pattern is similar to that observed in Figure 1 and for the size-adjusted abnormal returns 
as well. 
As discussed previously, Chan et al. (2004) document financial drift in their data, 
particularly for quarterly data, but the magnitude and duration of this drift diminishes 
quickly. For example, the return spread between top and bottom growth quintiles in their 
sample is not different from zero at the end of the first 12 months. On the other hand, the 
findings reported in this study indicate significant financial momentum effects that may 
persist across all estimation periods although it dissipates quickly as more years of past 
performance data are included in the measurement interval. 
The results of stocks ranked according to their CFG rates over one through five 
years prior to the portfolio formation date are presented in Table 7. On average, low- 
growth stocks (PI) have raw annual returns ranging from 25.46 percent for the one-year 
formation period (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 3 1.53 percent for the five- 
year estimation horizon (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). Stocks ranking highest 
in the past cash flow-growth rates (P10) generate average returns from 21.12 percent 
(Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 18.86 percent (Panel C under the 
AverageIAR column) for one- and five-year measurement durations, respectively. On 
average, firms ranking lowest in cash flow-growth rates outperform their cohort firms in 
the highest growtli rate decile by a wide margin in all sample periods regardless of the 
estimation periods, for return differentials from 4.33 percent (t = 4.55) for the one-year 
formation (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) and 12.57 percent (t = 7.75) for the 
five-year estimation period (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This finding is 
similar to that documented in prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Desai et al. 
[2004]). 
[Table 71 
The difference between the top and bottom growth deciles, i.e., PI-PlO, in the 
average size-adjusted returns exhibit similar patterns to the spread in raw returns but with 
slightly smaller magnitude. For average size-adjusted returns, the smallest difference was 
3.75 percent (t = 3.87) for the one year formation horizon (Panel A under the 
AverageIASAR column), while the largest was 9.32 percent (t = 6.07) for the five year 
formation horizon (Panel C under the AverageIASAR column). 
The results in Table 7 indicate that low-growth stocks (PI) generate higher 
annual raw returns and higher size-adjusted abnormal returns than their high-growth 
counterparts (P10) in all years across the five formation periods except in the first post- 
formation year for the one-year estimation interval. As with OEG and EBG, firms in the 
top growth decile (P10) based on one-year CFG earn greater returns (4.98 percent; t = 
1.65) and size-adjusted returns (5.73 percent; t = 2.06), respectively than their low growth 
firm counterparts (P 1) in year 1 (see Panel A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns). 
As observed in Table 5 and Table 6, the first year returns are weaker compared to that for 
two- through five-year estimation periods. Once again this behavior is consistent with a 
price drift effect following relatively strong (weak) accounting-based financial 
performance (see Figure 1). The size-adjusted one-year return reveals a more robust drift 
effect compared to the one-year raw return. This evidence is reflected in the negative 
size-adjusted return to the PI-PI0 portfolio in the first post-formation year for two years 
of past financial data. 
The results of growth portfolios based on their past growth rates in ACFG are 
reported in Table 8. On average, firms ranking lowest (PI) in ACFG earn average raw 
returns ranging from 26.62 percent (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 32.53 
percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column) for one- and five-year estimation 
periods of past cash flow growth. On the other hand, the average raw return of firms in 
the top growth rate decile (P10) ranges from 21.58 percent (Panel A under the 
AverageIAR column) to 18.97 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This 
indicates, on average, a return gap varying from 5.03 percent (t = 5.34) as shown in Panel 
A under the AverageIAR column to 12.56 percent (t = 8.26) as shown in Panel C under 
the AverageIAR column. For the five-year formation interval, the returns for the P 1 -PI0 
portfolio are 12.09, 13.72, and 1 1.38 percent for post-formation years 1 through 3 (see 
Panel C under the Year 1 through Year 3lR1 through R3 columns), respectively. This 
compares to 14.9, 5.6, and 1.9 percent returns reported by Desai et al. (2004). On 
average, the magnitude of the results reported here are about two times of those reported 
in Desai et al. (2004). The size-adjusted abnormal returns reported in this thesis for the 
PI-PI0 portfolio are 8.84, 11.54, and 8.50 percent (Panel C under the Year 1 through 
Year 3lSARl through SAR3 columns) for the first, second, and third post-formation 
years, respectively, compared to 12.6, 6.6, and 1.6 percent reported in Desai et al. (2004) 
for the same periods. 
Results in Table 8 reveal that firms in the bottom growth decile (PI) continue to 
outperform their counterparts in the top growth decile (P10) by a wide margin after the 
third year of the test horizon. For example, the returns for firms in the P1 portfolio are 
14.69 and 12.00 percent greater than those for firms in the P10 portfolio in years 4 and 5, 
respectively (see Panel C under the Years 4 and 5lR4 and R5 columns). 
[Table 81 
The results shown in Table 8 indicate that low-growth firms (PI) achieve higher 
returns compared to high-growth firms (P10) for all holding horizons across the five 
estimation intervals except in the first post-formation year for stocks sorted by their past 
one-year growth rates. As reported in Table 8, the PI-PI0 portfolio has a raw return of 
-3.58 percent (t = 1.16) and size-adjusted abnormal returns of -4.22 percent (t = 1.46) as 
shown in Panel A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns, respectively. The P 1 -P 10 first 
year return relative to its second year return for all estimation intervals indicates that 
momentum exists across all estimation horizons (see Figure I), but it becomes weaker as 
the formation period increases. The pattern observed in the raw returns of the P1 -PI0 
portfolio holds for its size-adjusted returns as well. 
The evidence of a price drift reported in Table 8 after exceptionally high (low) 
cash flow growth suggests the presence of market momentum shown in Tables 5, 6, and 
7. Further, the relatively smaller size of year 1 returns compared to that of years 2 
through 5 for each formation interval, as well as its stronger impact as more periods of 
past financial growth are included in the formation intervals, is suggestive of a market 
price momentum effect following strong (weak) accounting-based financial measures. 
The results of growth portfolios formed on the basis of past stock returns over the 
preceding one through five years are displayed in Table 9. The low-growth portfolio (PI) 
average returns range from 24.26 percent (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 
30.08 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column) for the one- and five-year 
estimation horizons, respectively, compared to 16.45 and 15.69 percent for high-growth 
decile firms (PI 0). On average, the P1 -P 10 portfolio returns range from 7.28 (t = 5.59) as 
shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column to 13.81 percent (t = 5.65) as shown in 
Panel C under the AverageIAR column for the same estimation horizons. For the size- 
adjusted return, on average, firms in the bottom decile (PI) outperform firms in top decile 
(P10) by 4.73 percent (t = 4.76) for the one-year measurement horizon (Panel A under the 
AverageIASAR column) and 8.63 percent (t = 4.52) for the five-year estimation horizon 
(Panel C under the AverageIASAR column). 
[Table 91 
For the one-year estimation period, the P1 -PI0 has a raw return of 3.04 (t = 1.04) 
and a size-adjusted abnormal return of 0.1 1 percent (t = 0.05), respectively (see Panel A 
under the Year 11R1 and SARl colun~ns). In unreported results, in the first post- 
formation year, firms with the highest prior year returns outperform their counterparts 
with the lowest returns in the months of February through December but not in January. 
In this first year, losers earn about two third of their annual returns in January alone 
compared to less than one third for their winner counterparts in this month. 
Although the P 1 -P 10 portfolio returns are positive, particularly its raw return, the 
pattern of first year returns across all estimation periods is suggestive of a price drift (see 
Figure 1). The magnitude and persistence, however, of this drift tend to dissipate as more 
years of past returns are included. A similar result for size-adjusted returns in the first 
post-formation year obtains. 
The lack of evidence of a market price momentum effect, particularly for firms 
ranked by their prior one-year returns, seems to contradict the findings of prior studies 
(e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011). However, this observed difference might be 
due to the visibility of price momentum strategies in the investment communities over the 
recent past (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). Such publicity would result in lessening or 
eliminating its profitability potential as an investment strategy. The superior returns for 
many well-known market anomalies dissipate after the publication of the original work 
documenting the phenomenon. For example, the higher performance of value stocks 
relative to growth stocks (Lakonishok et al. 1994) has declined in recent years and 
become insignificant after the first post-formation year (see Table 2 in Desai at el. 
[2004]). 
A recent study by Chan et al. (2004) provides evidence of the erosion of price 
momentum profitability. Sorting firms by their previous 12-month returns, they find 
firms ranking highest in prior returns enjoy an annual raw return 2.40 percent (t = 1.33) 
greater than that of firms with the lowest past returns. This return is much smaller than 
those returns (12.4 percent; t = 3.07) reported in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Meanwhile, Chan et al. (2004) report results that are similar to those reported here given 
their longer sample time period (1976 to 2000) compared to 1983 to 1999 used in this 
study. 
In summary, the preceding analyses include several key findings. First, firms in 
the lowest growth ranks (PI) based on their past performance significantly outperform 
firms in the highest growth ranks (PIO) across all performance variables and estimation 
horizons. This evidence contradicts Chan et al. (2004), but it is consistent with prior 
studies in the value firms-growth firm literature (e.g., Lakonishok et al. 1994). Second, 
this difference might be attributed to the longer and different sample time period (1968 to 
1990) of Lakonishok et al. (1994) compared to 1983 to 1999 used in this study. Finally, it 
could be due to the inclusion of NASDAQ firms in the current study while Lakonishok et 
al. analyze NYSE and AMEX firms only. Desai et al. (2004), however, include 
NASDAQ firms over the period 1976 to 2000 and report evidence similar to the finding 
in this study. 
As well, the P 1 -P 10 returns increase uniformly with the estimation intervals. That 
is, the longer the measurement horizon of past performance, the stronger the P1 -PI0 
returns. This behavior of the return spread between low- and high-growth portfolios is 
driven by the steadily rising returns of firms in the bottom growth decile, and to a lesser 
extent, by the declining returns of firms in the top decile as the pre-formation periods 
increase. 
In addition, for all performance measures in this study, the size-adjusted abnormal 
return for high-growth firms is negative (or close to zero), and it is negatively related to 
the number of years comprising the formation intervals. This evidence is consistent with 
the predictions of behavioral models suggesting investors put significant emphasis on a 
firm's past financial performance when projecting its future prospects (e.g., Lakonishok 
et al. [1994], Daniel et al. [1998], and Barberis et al. [1998]). Firms showing relatively 
strong (weak) financial performance in the past are expected to maintain such 
performance in the future. This optimism (pessimism) on the part of investor leads to 
stock prices that deviate significantly from their underlying values. As investors are 
disappointed (surprised) by the subsequent performance of high (low) growth firms, stock 
prices recover to fundamental values. 
In the first post-formation year for firms sorted on the basis of their past year 
accounting-based measures (except SG), strong evidence of a price drift following 
exceptionally high (low) financial performance is found. During the first year after 
portfolios were formed, firms in the top growth ranks tended to yield higher returns (both 
raw returns and size-adjusted abnormal returns) than their counterparts in the lowest 
growth ranks. The evidence is consistent with the existence of price drift after relatively 
high (low) past financial growth. Although PI-PI0 portfolio first year returns are 
positive beyond the first estimation interval of past growth data, financial momentum 
seems to persist even for longer formation horizons. The effects of this price drift can be 
inferred from the behavior and size of the P 1 -PI 0 returns in the first post-formation year 
across all estimation intervals relative to the PI-PI0 returns in years 2 through 5, 
although it is much weaker for SG and completely disappears after the first year of past 
sales data. The magnitude and duration of this drift, however, dissipates as more years of 
prior performance are included. Apart from the post-earnings announcement drift 
literature, the existing literature on market momentum is exclusively related to past price 
movements. To the best of my knowledge, no other study offers evidence of financial 
momentum effects for stocks sorted by their past growth rates in accounting-based 
performance measures, particularly for a one-year estimation period. 
Taken together, the evidence documented in this subsection supports hypotheses 
H1 through H4. The average return for the P1-P10 portfolio is positive in every case and 
statistically significant across all measures and formation periods. Although there is 
evidence of significant financial drift in year 1 returns in all measures (except SG), 
following one year of prior financial performance data, the year 2 return for the same 
estimation interval is more than twice the price drift seen in year 1. Using the preceding 3 
to 12 month returns to classify stocks as past winners and losers conditional on trading 
volume, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that winners' gains in the first year after 
portfolio formation are almost nullified by price reversals in years 2 through 5. This is not 
the case for accounting-based measures used in this study. Thus, hypotheses H13 through 
H16 are not supported. This does not mean that there is no reversal in stock prices 
following their initial price drift. Rather, the long run return reversal during post- 
formation years 2 through 5 is more than three times the momentum return in year 1. 
Thus, a test that tracks the behavior of stock prices over both the estimation and test 
periods might be a better way to assess the relation between these two phenomena. 
Finally, firms with high stock returns in the year before the formation date earn a 
size-adjusted abnormal return of 0.1 1 (t = 0.05) percent less than firms in the bottom 
return decile in the first post-formation year. The gap in raw returns between firms in the 
top and bottom past return deciles is not significantly different from zero as well (3.04 
percent; t = 1.04). This lack of evidence of a price drift in raw returns is not consistent 
with the price momentum literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [1993]). The difference 
between results reported here and those of prior studies might be attributed to reasons 
discussed earlier in this section. Chan et al. (2004) provide evidence that reconciles these 
findings with the extant literature on price momentum strategies. Ranking stocks by their 
past 12-month returns, they observe a strong price drift over months 3 to 9, but by the end 
of 12 months the return differential between prior winners and losers becomes 
statistically insignificant (2.40 percent; t = 1 .33).22 
6.2.2 Consistent Growth Portfolios 
The return performance for various portfolios based on consistency of past 
performance in sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns are presented in this 
subsection. At the end of December for each year in the sample period, firms are sorted 
by their performance over the previous year and then assigned to three growth groups 
(top 40 percent, middle 20 percent, and bottom 40 percent). The top-forty percent of 
l2  In unreported results, for portfolios formed based on one-year past return, stocks in the top decile 
outperform their counterpart stocks in the bottom decile in almost every month from February to 
December, but not in January. 
firms with the highest growth rate are referred to as high growth firms and the bottom- 
forty percent of firms with the lowest growth rate are identified as low growth firms. 
Firms in the high-growth group consistently ranking in the top 40 percent each 
year for all years included in the single estimation interval are classified as "consistent 
high-growth firms" (CHG) for that estimation interval. Similarly, firms in the low 
growth group consistently ranking in the lowest 40 percent each year for all years 
comprising a single estimation period are defined as "consistent low-growth firms" 
(CLG). To assess how consistency in a firm's past financial performance affects 
investors' expectations about its future prospects, firms sorted by their one-year growth 
rates are used as benchmarks. 
In Tables 10 through 15, panel A includes the return performance for the 
benchmark portfolio, while returns for portfolios constructed based on consistency of past 
growth rates, i.e., CHG and CLG portfolios and their return spreads (CLG-CHG) are 
reported in Panel B and Panel c . ~ ~  The return differentials between returns of CLG-CHG 
portfolios and that of the benchmark portfolio for each estimation interval are reported in 
the last row of Panel B and Panel C, i.e., CGP2-CGP1 and CGP4-CGP1. As in the 
previous subsection, annual raw returns and size-adjusted abnormal returns are provided. 
Five annual returns (R1 through R5) and size-adjusted abnormal returns (SARI through 
SAR5) are calculated for each estimation period.24 As well, average annual returns (AR) 
and average size-adjusted abnormal returns (ASAR) are computed over the test period 
(years 1 through 5). The last rows in Panel B and Panel C include the return spread 
" Unreported performance for portfolios based on the 31d estimation intervals show similar patterns as 
those of reported results. 
l4 To avoid potential autocorrelation in stock returns caused by overlapping holding periods, each year after 
the formation date is considered an independent observation. 
between the benchmark portfolios and that of the CLG-CHG portfolios at each respective 
estimation horizon. 
The return performance for firms ranked by consistency in their past SG over the 
previous one through four years are presented in Table 10. These results show that, on 
average, consistent low-growth firms (CLG) outperform their consistent high-growth 
firm (CHG) counterparts across all estimation horizons although the return gap is 
statistically significant only in the first two post-formation years. Panel B of Table 10 
reveals that an incremental year of consistency of past sales growth has a slightly positive 
impact on the return of CLG-CHG portfolio. 
[Table 101 
The return results for the various portfolios formed on the basis of consistency in 
past OEG over prior periods are displayed in Table 11. Firms in the consistent low- 
growth portfolio (CLG) have an average return between 19.92 percent and 21.44 percent, 
while firms in the consistent high-growth portfolio (CHG) earn between 19.23 and 17.17 
percent (see Panel A and Panel C under the AverageIAR column, respectively). The 
average return gap between consistent low and high-growth firms, i.e., the CLG-CHG 
return, ranges from 0.30 (t = 0.52) as shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column 
and 3.67 percent (t = 1.56) as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column for one 
and four years of past OEG, respectively. The average size-adjusted return exhibits a 
similar pattern. 
As in Table 5, firms with consistent low past growth (CLG) perform significantly 
better than firms with consistent high-growth rates (CHG) in all holding periods across 
all estimation horizons, except in the first year of the holding period based on a one-year 
estimation horizon. Panel A, Table 11 shows that firms in the CHG portfolio outperform 
firms in the CLG portfolio by 4.33 (t = 2.67) and 4.67 percent (t = 2.96) for annual raw 
returns and size-adjusted returns, respectively (see Panel A under the Year 11R1 and 
SARl columns). This evidence is consistent with effects of financial momentum after 
relatively strong (weak) earning performance as shown in Table 5. 
The first year return compared to the second year return for the CLG-CHG 
portfolio across all the estimation horizons exhibits a price drift following an incremental 
year of consistency in operating growth similar to that graphed in Figure 1. This drift 
persists for longer formation horizons. 
On average, the CLG-CHG portfolio outperforms the benchmark portfolio by 
1.98 percent (t = 2.5 1) as shown in the last row of Panel B under the AverageIAR column 
to 3.33 percent (t = 2.98) as shown in the last row of Panel C under the AverageIAR 
column for two and four estimation intervals, respectively. This return differential 
increases with .the measurement horizon of past financial performance. In other words, 
the longer the estimation interval of consistency in past OEG, the larger the return gap 
between the CLG-CHG portfolio and the benchmark portfolio (see Figure 2). 
[Table 111 
The test results of portfolios formed based on consistency of growth rates in EBG 
are reported in Table 12. As in the previous two tables, Panel A includes the return 
performance for the benchmark portfolio, while returns for portfolios constructed based 
on consistency of past growth rates are reported in Panels B and C. Results in Table 12 
indicate that across all formation and investment horizons except one, firms in the CLG 
portfolio earn a higher return compared to firms in the CHG portfolio. The exception is 
the returns in the first post-formation year for the benchmark portfolios. The average 
annual return for the CLG-CHG portfolio ranges from 0.68 (t = 1.45) as shown in Panel 
A under the AverageIAR column to 4.95 percent (t = 2.45) as shown in Panel C under the 
AverageIAR column. Similarly, the CLG-CHG average size-adjusted return varies from 
0.44 (t = 0.91) to 4.08 percent (t = 2.32) per year (see Panel A and Panel C under the 
AverageIASAR column, respectively). Both returns are positively related to the 
measurement horizons of past financial performance. 
Consistent with the evidence reported in Table 6, Panel A (Year 11R1 column) of 
Table 12 shows that for one year of past earnings growth, firms in the CHG portfolio 
earned raw returns of 4.65 percent (t = 3.54) greater than that of firms in the CLG 
portfolio. Similar results obtain for size-adjusted returns (5.07 percent; t = 3.79) as shown 
in Panel A under the Year lISAR1 column. Evidence provided in Panel B and Panel C 
indicates that the behavior of the CLG-CHG return in the first year compared to second 
year for all estimation periods suggests that a drift in stock prices persists as more years 
of performance consistency are included in the estimation period. This pattern is similar 
to that depicted in Figure 1. 
As shown in the last row of Panels B and C under the AverageIAR column, the 
returns for the CLG-CHG portfolio exceed that of the benchmark portfolio by margins 
ranging from 2.59 (t = 3.73) to 4.63 percent (t = 2.02). The magnitude of this return gap 
increases as more years of past earnings growth rates are included in the estimation 
period as illustrated in Figure 2. 
[Table 12 and Figure 21 
The return results for portfolios following consistent growth patterns in CFG over 
the preceding one through four years are shown in Panels A-C of Table 13. These results 
suggest that firms consistently ranking in the lowest growth rate (CLG) outperform firms 
consistently ranking in the highest growth (CHG) across the four formation intervals. 
Firms in the CLG portfolios earn average annual returns varying from 19.70 percent 
(Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 22.55 percent (Panel C under the 
AverageIAR column) compared to average returns ranging from 19.12 percent to 16.82 
percent for firms in the CHG portfolios for one and four year measurement intervals, 
respectively. This gives rise to return differentials of 0.58 (t = 1.29) and 5.73 percent (t = 
2.83), i.e., -the CLG-CHG return, for the same formation periods (see Panel A and Panel 
C under the AverageIAR column, respectively). Further, on average the CLG-CHG 
portfolio earned a size-adjusted return of 0.35 (t = 0.75) and 4.61 percent (t = 2.30) for 
the one-year and four-year estimation intervals, respectively (see Panel A and Panel C 
under the AverageIASAR column). The CLG-CHG returns increases uniformly as more 
years of past performance date are included in the analysis (see Figure 2). 
In the first post-formation year, the CLG-CHG portfolio earned -3.77 (t = -3.02) 
and -4.19 percent (t = -3.37) for raw returns and size-adjusted returns, respectively (Panel 
A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns). This finding suggests a financial momentum 
effect after relatively strong (weak) past cash flow performance consistent with evidence 
reported in Table 7. This is evident from the pattern of the CLG-CHG first year return 
compared to its second year return for all estimation horizons (see Figure 1). Further, the 
difference in returns between the CLG-CHG and the benchmark portfolios affirms the 
positive impact of consistency in prior performance on future returns as documented in 
Tables 11 and 12. Results in Panel B and Panel C (under the AverageIAR column) show 
that the CLG-CHG portfolio outperforms the benchmark portfolio by an average annual 
return ranging from 2.41 (t = 3.19) to 5.47 percent (t = 2.38). The return differential 
widens as the measurement period of past performance variables increases. 
[Table 131 
In Panel A through Panel C of Table 14, the results for portfolios based on growth 
consistency in ACFG are provided. The return performance documented in this table 
shows that the CLG portfolio, on average, achieves a higher return between 20.38 percent 
(Panel A under the AverageIAR column) and 23.42 percent (Panel C under the 
AverageIAR column) for one- and four-year formation intervals, respectively, compared 
to 19.49 and 16.35 percent for the CHG portfolio for the same estimation periods. The 
average annual return gap between the CLG and CHG portfolios is 0.89 (t = 1.84) and 
7.06 percent (t = 2.43) for the same formation intervals indicated above as shown in 
Panels A and C under the AverageIAR column. Results are similar for the size-adjusted 
returns. 
Results in Panel A indicate that firms in the CHG portfolio earn a raw returns 3.30 
percent (t = 2.70) and size-adjusted returns 3.73 percent (t = 3.03) greater than those of 
firms in the CLG portfolio in the first post-formation year (see Panel A under the Year 
11R1 and SARl columns). This evidence is consistent with results reported in Panel A, 
Table 8. The behavior of first year one returns of the CLG-CHG portfolio relative to that 
of its second year returns across all estimation periods is similar to the pattern illustrated 
in Figure 1 indicating the presence of price drift. The return gap between the CLG-CHG 
portfolio and the benchmark portfolio ranges from 2.61 percent (t = 3.25) as shown in the 
last row of Panel B under the AverageIAR column to 6.57 percent (t = 2.16) as shown in 
the last row of Panel C under the AverageIAR column. The difference in size-adjusted 
return is similar. 
[Table 141 
Results for portfolios based on consistency of past stock returns over the prior one 
to five years are presented in Panel A through Panel C of Table 15. The findings indicate 
that firms consistently ranking in the bottom growth (CLG), on average, yield a higher 
return than firms consistently ranking in the top growth (CHG) across all investment and 
estimation horizons. For instance, the CLG-CHG portfolio has an average annual raw 
return ranging from 2.71 percent (t-statistics = 4.37) for the first estimation period as 
shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column and 8.33 percent (t-statistics = 3.51) for 
the four-year estimation horizons as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column. 
This return differential increases uniformly with the estimation period of past stock 
returns (see Figure 2). 
The returns reported in Panel A of Table 15 are consistent with the evidence 
provided in Panel A of Table 9. In both cases, the return spreads between low- and high- 
growth firms (prior winners and losers) are not significantly different from zero. The 
results suggest that findings reported in Table 9 are not attributable to extreme 
observations associated with decile ranking since the influence of extreme observations is 
significantly reduced in consistency sorting. 
The pattern of the CLG-CHG return in the first holding year compared to the 
second year for all formation horizons is consistent with price momentum effects 
following an incremental year of consistent high (low) past returns (see Figure 1). 
Results reported in Panel B and Panel C of Table 15 reveal that consistency of a 
firm's prior stock returns affects the behavior of its subsequent prices. On average, the 
CLG-CHG portfolio has a higher return ranging from 3.79 percent (t = 3.41) to 6.33 
percent (t = 2.74) than that of the benchmark portfolio (see the last row of Panel B and 
Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This return spread increases uniformly with the 
measurement horizon. 
In summary, the findings of this subsection and their relation to the predictions of 
behavioral models include the following. First, on average, consistent low-growth firms 
(CLG) earn superior returns relative to consistent high-growth firms (CHG) across all 
estimation intervals and performance variables. The CLG-CHG return is an increasing 
function of the measurement period. This behavior is driven by the increasing returns for 
firms in the CLG portfolio and the diminishing returns for firm in the CHG portfolio as 
more years of past performance are included in the estimation period. This finding is 
consistent with the predictions of psychology-based theories (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 
and Barberis et al. [1998]). The central theme of these theories is that investors overly 
emphasize a firm's past performance when projecting its future prospects. This causes 
stocks of firms consistently performing well in the past to be over-priced, and 
subsequently, these stocks earn lower returns as investors are disappointed by the actual 
performance of these firms. Conversely, stocks of firms consistently performing poorly in 
the past become under-priced, and these stocks generate higher returns in the future as 
investors are surprised by the relatively strong performance of these firms. These findings 
support hypotheses H5 through H8. 
Second, for a one-year formation interval, firms in the CHG portfolios outperform 
firms in the CLG portfolios in the first year for all variables with the exception of SG 
and, to some degree, PRET. This evidence is consistent with the existence of financial 
momentum effects following an exceptionally strong (weak) financial performance. 
Further, the pattern of the CLG-CHG return in the first year compared to the second year 
across all estimation intervals is consistent with the effects of price drift even in longer 
estimation horizons. 
Traditionally, evidence of momentum is attributed to investors' under-reaction to 
information included in firms' past financial performance (e.g., Barberis et al. [1998]). 
However, Daniel et al. (1998) view such findings as evidence of a market over-reaction 
that continues to drift before prices eventually return to fundamental values. Similarly, 
they view the evidence of long-run price reversal as a market correction to prior over- 
pricing. According to Daniel et al.'s (1998) model, if the initial financial drift reported 
here is due to investor failure to incorporate fundamental information contained in past 
performance variables into stock prices in a timely manner, a subsequent price reversal 
should not be observed. 
Finally, on average, the CLG-CHG portfolio achieves greater returns relative to 
the benchmark portfolio across all variables with the exception of SG. This return 
differential increases uniformly as more estimation intervals of past performance are 
included. Thus, hypotheses H 10 through H 12 are supported. 
Daniel et al. (1998) attribute market over-reaction to investors' overconfidence 
and self-attribution bias. In their theory, investors' overconfidence in their investment 
skills and ability to identify future winning stocks creates the first part of the over- 
reaction, while subsequent evidence confirming investors' prior actions leads to further 
over-reaction. Results reported here are consistent with this prediction. Findings of this 
study indicate that the second and the third years of evidence confirming performance 
growth have the most significant impact on future returns. After the third year, further 
evidence affirming the already observed pattern of past financial growth has little effect 
on the behavior of future returns. This might be because investors have already formed 
strong opinions about the future prospects of consistent low (high) growth firms (see 
Figure 2). In other words, investors expect these firms to maintain this level of 
performance for many years to come, and this expectation is impounded in the current 
stock prices. 
6.3 Regression Test Results 
Analyses reported in the previous section for various growth portfolios based 011 
past growth rates in performance variables reveal that firms with low growth rates 
generally earn higher returns relative to firms with high-growth rates. However, 
descriptive statistics presented (see Tables 2 and 3) suggests that low-growth firms are 
more likely to be associated with slightly higher book-to-market ratios (BIM) compared 
to high-growth firms. In this section, past performance measures will be assessed to 
determine whether they have incremental predictive power for subsequent stock returns 
after controlling for Beta and BIM. For each post-formation year, the annual size-adjusted 
abnormal return (SAR) for firm j is regressed on the scaled decile ranks of past growth 
rates in its performance measures during the estimation interval as well as on the scaled 
decile ranks of its Beta, BIM, and Size at the beginning of the period in cross-sectional 
regressions.25 
For each post-formation year (years 1 through 5), the regressions in Equations 1 
and 2, as well as a regression with past performance variables and Size only, are 
estimated over the sample period. The magnitudes, signs, and significance levels of the 
variable coefficients are virtually identical for all three cross-sectional regression models. 
Therefore, discussion in this section will concentrate on the full model (model 3). The 
time-series averages of these estimates are computed from annual regressions, and their t- 
statistics are calculated from the time-series variation of these coefficients as in Fama and 
MacBeth (1973). Results presented in Table 16 through Table 21 are based on annual 
regressions for the second post-formation year.26 The decision to report the parameter 
estimates for two-year returns after portfolio formation is based on the similarity between 
regression estimates across all holding horizons. 
The regression results for firms based on SG are presented in Table 16. The 
coefficients for SG are negative and statistically significant, for the first three estimation 
horizons. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients and t-statistics are inversely 
related to the measurement period of the past performance variable. For example, using 
model 3, the coefficient for SG is -0.053, -0.043, and -0.001 (t = -3.81, -2.51, and -0.03, 
25 Although SAR is used as the dependent variable in the regression approach, size ranks are included in the 
regressions to avoid biased coefficients on past performance measures (e.g., Bernard [1987], Foster et al. 
[1984], Ali et al. [2003], and Desai et al. [2004]). In unreported analysis, using raw returns instead of SAR 
obtains similar results. 
26 Unreported results based on the 2nd and 3rd estimation intervals exhibit the same patterns as reported 
results. 
respectively) for the prior one, three, and five years' sales growth, respectively, as shown 
in Panels A through C, Table 16. 
[Table 161 
In Table 17, regression estimates for firms ranked by OEG over the past one, 
three, and five years are reported. These results indicate that the variable coefficients for 
OEG across all estimation intervals are negative and significant (ranging from -0.056 (t = 
-2.35) to -0.074 (t = -2.40). This evidence is consistent with the portfolio analyses 
reported in the previous section. Findings in the portfolio approach indicate that a trading 
strategy of going long (short) on low (high) growth firms earns a substantial profit. This 
profit increases as more years of past financial performance are included. 
The regression coefficients for SARl are negative and significant for all 
formation periods of past operating earnings growth, suggesting that the momentum 
profitability documented in the previous section is one factor in the market's over- 
reaction to firms' past financial performance. Jegadeesh and Titman (200 1) argue that if 
new information is gradually incorporated into stock market prices, subsequent stock 
returns cannot be predicted once this information is completely reflected in stock prices. 
They further argue that returns to a trading strategy based on realized past returns after 
the first twelve months should be zero. Therefore, if firms' price momentum following a 
period of remarkably high (low) past realizations is a product of investor over-reaction to 
outstanding past performance, the momentum returns and subsequent reversals are likely 
to be negatively related (Daniel et al. 1998). 
[Table 171 
The results of the regression analyses for stocks based on EBG are presented in 
Table 18, arranged in Panels A through C by estimation intervals. Coefficients for EBG 
are negative and significant for all estimation intervals, varying from -0.064 (t = -3.69) to 
-0.058 (t = -2.75) for one and five years of past growth, respectively. These results 
confirm the predictive ability of EBG after controlling for market betas and book-to- 
market ratios. As well, although the regression coefficient for SARl is not statistically 
significant for the second post-formation year, it is negative and significant for year 3 and 
year 4 across all estimation intervals (i.e., in the five-year estimation period, the 
estimated coefficient for year three is -0.099 with a t-statistic of -4.68, and the estimated 
coefficient for year four is -0.072 with a t-statistic of 3.35). This evidence is consistent 
with the argument that price drift effects following exceptional financial performance are 
a manifestation of investors' over-reaction rather than a market under-reaction as is 
commonly believed (e.g., Daniel et al. [ I  9981 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]). 
[Table 181 
In Table 19, the regression analyses results for firms on the basis of CFG are 
presented. These results indicate that the coefficients for CFG are negative and 
significant for all estimation horizons. In addition, the magnitudes and significance of the 
coefficients for CFG increase uniformly as more years of past cash flow growth are 
included in the regression analyses. 
The above finding is consistent with the evidence reported in the preceding 
portfolio analyses and with prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], La Porta et al. 
[1997], and Desai et al. [2004]). The variable SARl is negative and significant across all 
measurement intervals of CFG suggesting a reversal of market momentum returns. Once 
again this evidence supports the view that price momentum observed subsequent to 
relatively strong (weak) financial performance is a market over-reaction rather than a 
market under-reaction (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]). 
[Table 191 
The results of the regression estimates for firms ranked by ACFG are presented in 
Table 20. These results indicate that the coefficients for ACFG are -0.065 (t = -3.12) and 
-0.075 (t = -2.56) for one and five years estimation intervals, respectively. This evidence 
is consistent with the findings reported in the preceding portfolio analyses in which a 
strong association between estimation intervals of past financial measures and subsequent 
stock returns was indicated. The regression coefficients for SARl are negative for all 
measurement durations of past growth rates in ACFG. This finding confirms the 
existence of a negative relation between a positive price drift in the first year after 
portfolios formation and portfolio returns for years 2 through 5. 
[Table 201 
The time-series regression coefficients analyzing portfolios based on PRET over 
the preceding one to five years are reported in Table 2 1. The coefficients for PRET are 
-0.1 10 (t = -5.09) and -0.1 14 (t = -5.35) for one year and five years of past stock return 
data, respectively. SARl is negative across all estimation periods, which is evidence of a 
strong relation between the market momentum effects and subsequent price reversals 
documented in prior studies (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [I9931 and DeBondt and Thaler 
[1985]). This finding is inconsistent with that of Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) who 
report a weak relation between the intermediate price drift and long-term price reversals. 
However, it supports the view that the intermediate price drift should be viewed as a 
market over-reaction that corrects itself in the form of a price reversal over the long term 
(e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]). 
[Table 211 
In conclusion, the evidence summarized in Tables 16 through 21 suggests the 
following. The average regression coefficients for all past performance measures (except 
SG in the last two estimation periods) are negative across all estimation horizons. This 
finding is consistent with evidence reported in the portfolio analyses approach. The 
evidence reported in the portfolio test shows that buying (selling) value (growth) firms 
generate a high return and this returns increases uniformly with the estimation intervals 
of past performance measures. 
Third, the size-adjusted abnormal returns in the first year are negatively related to 
the size-adjusted abnormal returns for years 2 through 5 for all performance variables and 
estimation periods. This is consistent with evidence of a return drift documented in 
preceding portfolio analyses. As discussed previously, this negative association suggests 
that the momentum profit reported in year 1 after portfolio formation is more likely to be 
an integral part of market over-reaction to exceptionally high (low) past financial growth 
that subsequently reverts to fundamental values over the long term. Furthermore, the 
evidence provided in this study contradicts the findings of Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(2004). They report a weak association between intermediate price drift and long-run 
price reversal. 
Taken together, the evidence is consistent with the predictions of behavioral 
models (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Daniel et al. [1998]) that investors overact to 
firms' historical financial performance because investors are likely to extrapolate firms' 
past performance into the future. Thus, firms achieving relatively strong (weak) financial 
performance in the past are expected to maintain this performance almost indefinitely. As 
a consequence, high (low) growth firms are likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and 
subsequently, these firms should under-perform (outperform) the market as their market 
prices returns to fundamental values. 
CHAPTER VII 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
7.1 Largest Firms 
Most abnormal returns are said to be limited to small firms due to their 
associations with higher trading costs that make them expensive to be included in most 
trading strategies. To ensure that the results reported in this dissertation are not driven by 
abnormal returns attributed to small firms, analyses presented in Tables 4 through 22 are 
repeated using only the largest 50 percent of firms in terms of their market values of 
equity capital in the study sample. Untabulated results of the above analysis reveal that 
the key findings reported in the present study are robust even after restricting the analysis 
to the largest 50 percent of firms. 
7.2 Seasonality 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) argue that, unlike price momentum, the effect of 
the long-run price reversal is largely attributed to a January effect. They conclude that 
these two phenomena are driven by different forces with different seasonal behavior. 
However, the findings of prior research suggest that the January effect is more 
pronounced for losing firms across all holding horizons, and it is not a distinct feature of 
the long-term price reversal as suggested by Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004). Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993, 2001) suggest that momentum strategy profitability has a strong 
seasonal component. They show that past winners earn higher returns compared to prior 
losers in all months except January in which losers outperform winners. 
To examine whether the behavior of stock returns, particularly that of losing 
stocks, differs across all post-formation horizons, the return performance of all portfolios 
are analyzed separately in January and in February .through December of each year. 
Untabulated results show that portfolio returns are not concentrated in January across all 
variables, estimation intervals, and investment horizons. However, in the first year after 
portfolio formation across all measurement periods, firms in the lowest stock return 
deciles yield higher stock returns compared to firms in the highest return deciles in 
January. This finding is consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,2001). 
CHAPTER VIII 
Conclusions 
In the classic economic theories, individuals are assumed to be perfectly rational 
with infinite information processing capacities. The standard market models, such as the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the efficient 
market hypothesis of Fama (1965, 1970), and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Ross 
(1976) are based on these two assumptions. Further, the traditional market argument is 
that even if investors are biased and make mistakes, the resulting errors are not correlated 
across individuals; they have no bearing on market price formation because they average 
out in market equilibrium. 
However, a growing literature on judgments and decision making processes 
suggests that divergence from rationality is common rather than an exception in human 
behavior due to limitations of time, information processing capacities, and other 
cognitive resource constraints (e.g., Hirslileifer [2001], Simon [1955],Trivers [1985, 
19911, and Tversky and Kahneman [1974]). In recent years, several authors (e.g., 
Barberis et al. [1998], Daniel et al. [1998], and Hong and Stein [1999]) have incorporated 
investors' psychology into economic models in attempts to provide a parsimonious- 
theoretical framework that accounts for the factors that influence market prices. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggest people are likely to over-react to salient, 
attention-grabbing, and easy to recall information. Chan et al. (2004) argue that financial 
measures are not only salient, but they are also readily available to the vast majority of 
financial market participants. Lee (2001) argues that to affect market prices, investor 
sentiments must be systematic and that the role of accounting research is to contribute to 
our understanding about factors that give rise to these common investor biases and their 
impact on the market pricing mechanism. 
This dissertation has three objectives. First, it examines whether past growth 
patterns of firms' performance measures are likely to influence investor perceptions 
about the future prospects of these firms. Second, using a range of formation intervals, 
this study investigates whether the interaction between observed patterns and estimation 
horizons of these variables affect investor expectations. Finally, it assesses whether the 
profitability of a momentum strategy and long run price reversals are a manifestation of a 
market over-reaction as suggested by recent studies (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lee 
and Swaminathan [2000]), or whether they are the result of some other underlying cause 
(e.g., Grinblatt and Moskowitz [2004]). 
Financial performance variables used in this study are annual data on sales, 
earnings, cash flow, and stock returns, measured over varying time horizons from a 
sample of publicly traded firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges 
from 1983 to 1999. To assess questions raised in this dissertation, various portfolio and 
regression tests were used. The results reported establish a number of empirical facts 
summarized below followed by a discussion of the relation to the extant literature. 
Firms in low-growth decile portfolios earn significantly higher returns compared 
firms in high-growth decile portfolios across performance measures, estimation intervals, 
and investment periods. The return differentials between the highest and the lowest 
growth deciles is positive for all post-formation years except in the first year for 
portfolios formed based on one year of prior financial performance data. This return gap 
between firms in high- and low-growth deciles increases monotonically as more years of 
past data are included in the analysis. 
Firms sorted by one-year growth rates in all accouiiting-based measures except 
SG provide evidence of a strong financial momentum effect in the first year after 
portfolio formation. The size and behavior of the portfolio return in the first year 
compared to returns in years 2 through 5 indicates the existence of a price drift, although 
the magnitude and the persistence of this drift dissipates as the estimation intervals 
increase. 
The finding reported in this study sharply contradicts Chan et al. (2004) who 
examine the marginal impact of past growth rates in operating and net income and sales 
on subsequent stock returns. Sorting firms into growth quintiles based on growth rates of 
these variables in the prior one and five years using quarterly and annual data, 
respectively, they found no discernable evidence of price reversals over the ensuing 36 
months. They document weak evidence of return drift, particularly for operating and net 
income measures, over the ensuing 3-6 months following the formation date, but by the 
end of the year, the return differential between low and high-growth firms virtually 
disappears. However, results of this thesis are consistent with other prior studies (e.g., 
Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Desai et al. [2004]). 
The evidence provided in this study is consistent with the behavioral model 
predictions that investors overestimate (underestimate) the growth prospects of high 
(low) growth firms (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], Daniel et al. [1998], and Barberis et 
al. [1998]). Thus, firms achieving relatively strong (weak) financial performance in the 
past tend to be over-priced (under-priced). Subsequently, however, prior high growth 
firms under-perform prior low growth firms as investors come to realize that their prior 
expectations have not materialized. 
Consistent low growth firms have greater returns relative to their consistent high 
growth firm counterparts across performance measures, estimation horizons, and holding 
periods, except in the first post-formation year. The return spread between these two 
portfolios increases uniformly with the estimation intervals of past performance 
measures. However, the evidence reported in this study shows that the second and third 
years of evidence confirming prior growth rates have the most marginal effect on future 
returns. Beyond the third year, for example, the impact of an incremental year of 
confirming evidence observed in the prior periods virtually disappears. 
Prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Desai et al. [2004]) have deemed 
a five-year period of past financial performance data as a sufficient time frame for 
investors to project a firm's past performance into the future. However, the evidence 
documented in this study indicates that it may not take investors more than two to three 
years of consistent growth patterns to upwardly bias their expectations about a firm's 
future prospects. 
In the first post-formation year, consistent high-growth firms outperform 
consistent low growth firms based on one year of past performance. This finding affirms 
the effects of financial momentum following exceptionally high or low financial 
performance. The price drift in the first year of the holding period seems to persist even 
in longer estimation horizons. 
Results of cross-sectional multiple regressions show that growth rates in past 
performance variables are strongly related to subsequent future returns after controlling 
for market betas and book-to-market ratios. This relation between future stock returns 
and historical financial measures strengthens as the estimation interval of these variables 
increases. Regression analysis reveals that first year returns are negatively related to 
returns in years 2 through 5 across all performance measures. This evidence is consistent 
with the view that the long-term price reversals are a response to prior market over- 
reaction (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Daniel et al. [1998]). This finding is 
inconsistent with that of Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004). 
Sorting firms by their prior 3 to 12-month stock returns conditional on trading 
volume, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) report that price drift in the first year after 
portfolio formation are almost nullified by price reversals in years 2 through 5.  This is not 
the case for accounting-based measures used in this study. Although there is strong 
evidence of financial drift in year 1 returns in all measures (except SG) following one 
year of prior relatively high (low) financial performance data, the average price reversal 
for years 2 through 5 for the same estimation interval is three times greater than the price 
drift observed in year 1. If this price reversal is a response to a prior market over-reaction 
(e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Daniel et al. [1998]), the price drift documented 
in the first year after portfolios are formed is only the final manifestation of that over- 
reaction. This evidence raises potential questions for future research. Specifically, a test 
that tracks the behavior of stock prices over both the estimation and test periods might be 
a better way to assess the relation between these two phenomena. 
Chan et al. (2004) find no discernable evidence that consistency in a firm's 
historical financial performance predicts subsequent stock returns. However, the findings 
of this thesis show that, on average, consistently low growth firms outperform their 
consistently high growth firm counterparts across all variables and estimation intervals. 
In this dissertation, I compare return performance for these two groups of firms. An 
interesting question for future research is to examine whether return performance differs 
within each category, i.e., consistent-high-growth firms vs. inconsistent-growth-firms and 
consistent-low-growth firms vs. inconsistent-low-growth firms. 
Finally, for prior one-year data of SG, PI outperforms PI0 while in OEG for the 
same estimation interval, PI0 outperfornls PI .  Chan et al. (2004) observe similar 
findings. This evidence suggests that growth in operating expenses might cause "an 
inversion." Further, the results provided in this thesis indicate that SG is not a good 
predictor of subsequent stock returns compared to the alternative accounting-based 
performance variables, i.e., OEG, EBG CFT, and ACFG. Future research may examine 
whether patterns of operating expenses explains this difference. 
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Appendix A 
Annual Growth Rates in Past Firm Performance Measures 
The annual growth rate in sales per share for firm j over a range of estimation 
horizons from one to five years prior to portfolio formation date is computed as follows: 
where SGjt is the annual geometric mean of growth rate in sales per share for firm j over 
the estimation intervals, ranging from one to five years relative to portfolio formation 
date t, ASPSjT is year-to-year changes in sales per share (SPS) for firm j in year z scaled 
by the average SPS lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1 
depending on the measurement horizon of past sale growth. 
The annual growth rate in earnings per share for firm j over the period prior to the 
formation horizons is computed as follows: 
where EG,t is the annual geometric mean of growth rate in earnings per share for firm j 
over the years preceding portfolio formation, AEPS,, is year-to-year changes in earnings 
per share (EPS) for firm j in year z scaled by the absolute value of the average EPS 
lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1 depending on the 
measurement horizon of past earnings growth. 
The annual per share growth in cash flow for firm j over the estimation intervals 
is computed as follows: 
where CFGjt is the annual geometric mean of growth rate in cash flow per share for firm j 
over the estimatioii periods prior to the formation date t, ACFPSj, is year-to-year changes 
in cash flow per share (CFPS) for firm j in year z scaled by the absolute value of the 
average CFPS lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1 
depending on the measurement horizon of past cash flow growth. 
To adjust operating cash flow for accruals, total accruals are estimated using the 
balance sheet approach: 27 
Accruals = (ACA - ACash) - (ACL - ASTD - ATP) - Dep 
where ACA is change in current assets, ACash is change in casWcash equivalents, ACL is 
change in short-term liabilities, ASTD is the change in long term debt included in current 
liabilities, ATP is change in income taxes payable, and Dep is depreciation and 
amortization expenses. Accruals are scaled by average total assets. Accounting operating 
27 This is consistent with prior research (e.g., Sloan [1996]). 
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cash flow (ACF) is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations plus depreciation and amortization expense minus working capital accruals. 
The annual stock returns for a firm j over time periods prior to formation horizon 
are calculated using monthly stock returns as follows: 
where PRetjt is the geometric mean of returns on the firm j's stocks over the measurement 
period prior to the formation date t, and Returnj, is the annual return for firm j in year z, 
where z ranges from -5 to -1 depending on the measurement horizon of past stock returns. 
Table 1 
Summary/Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: S a m ~ l e  Sizes of Firms with Annual Data Reauirements I Estimation I Performance Measures 
Panel B: Spearman (Pearson) Correlations among Performance Measures t 
Spearman (Pearson) correlations are in the upper-right (lower-left) diagonal of the Panel. 
Variable Definitions: 
SG = t h e  geometric mean of growth rate in sales over the 5-year estimation period before portfolio formation. 
OEG = the geometric mean of growth rate in operating earnings over the 5-year estimation period before portfolio 
formation. 
EBG = the geometric mean of growth rate in earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations over 
the 5-year estimation period before portfolio formation. 
CFG = the geometric mean of growth rate in cash flow as defined in the finance literature over the 5-year 
estimation period before portfolio formation. 
ACFG = the geometric mean of growth in cash flow as defined in the accounting literature over the 5-year 
estimation period before portfolio formation. 
PRET = t h e  geometric mean of stock returns over the 5-year estimation period before portfolio formation. 
BM = the book-to-market ratios at the fiscal year-end prior to portfolio formation date. 
Beta = a firm's market beta. It is calculated using monthly returns over the past 60 months, with a minimum of 36 
months, prior to portfolio formation date. 
Size = market value of equity capital at the portfolio formation date t. It is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the stock prices at portfolio formation date. 
t Characteristics of firms in the five-year estimation interval. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Growth Portfolios 
'anel A: Firms Sorted by Past Financial Performance Growth for the Prior One Year 
Performance Measures 
Portfolio Statistics SG OEG EBG CFG ACFG PRET 
Beta 1.05 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.14 1.15 
BM 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.83 0.96 
Size 1398 193 28 1 220 187 264 
Panel B: Firms Sorted by Past Financial Performance Growth for the Prior Two Years 
Performance Measures I 
Panel C: Firms Sorted bv Past Financial Performance Growth for the Prior Five Years 
I Performance Measures I 
Portfolio Statistics SG OEG , EBG CFG ACFG j PRET 
Beta 0.99 1.07 1.05 1.14 1.16 1.21 
P 1 BM 1.04 1.02 ' 1.03 1 1.01 0.82 1.10 
Beta, BM, and S I L ~  are defined under Table 1 All firms with ava~lable data from 1983 to 1999 ranked by growth rates 
in their past financial performance variables grouped into 10 growth deciles (PI -P10). The top 10% of fG&s with the 
highest growth rate is included in P I 0  and the bottom 10% of firms with the lowest growth rate is assigned to PI .  
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Consistent Growth Portfolios 
Panel A: Firms Sorted bv Growth Consistencv for the Prior One Year 
Portfolio 
CLG 
CHG 
Performance Measures I 
Statistics 
Firms 
Beta 
BM 
Size 
Firms 
Beta 
BM 
Size 
OEG 
1648 
1 .oo 
0.86 
9 17 
1648 
1.03 
0.77 
797 
EBG 
1646 
1 .oo 
0.86 
906 
1646 
1.03 
0.77 
872 
CFG 
1660 
1 .oo 
0.85 
92 8 
1660 
1.04 
0.77 
818 
ACFG 
1318 
1.03 
0.78 
909 
1318 
1.08 
0.72 
753 
PRET 
1597 
1.01 
0.79 
872 
1597 
1.02 
0.73 
1380 
CHG Beta BM 
Size 
Panel C: Firms Sorted by Growth Consistency for the Prior Four Years 
Performance Measures 
Portfolio ' Statistics SG OEG EBG CFG ACFG : PRET 
from 1983 to 1999, all firms with data on past performance measures are ranked independently by their growth rates in 
these variables over the prior one to four years and assigned to 3 growth groups (top 40 percent, middle 20 percent, and 
bottom 40 percent). Firms in top (bottom) 40 percent are referred to as high (low) growth firms. Firms in the high 
growth group consistently rank in the top 40 percent each year for the entire estimation intervals are classified as 
"consistent high growthfirms. " Similarly, low growth firms consistently rank in the bottom 40 percent each year for 
the entire estimation intervals are defined as "consistent low growthfirms. " Firms in the highest and lowest 40 percent 
based on one-year growth rates are used as benchmarks. 
Table 4 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Sales 
Growth Rates (SG) 
Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior Three Year SG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Averape 
Portfolio SARl 
7.72 
3.03 
-1.03 
-0.68 
8.76 
3.47 
SARS 
-1.44 
-1.10 
3.17 
1.48 
-1.74 
-0.71 
ASAR 
3.84 
4.09 
1.85 
3.50 
1.99 
2.08 
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios arc held without rcbalancing for the ensuing five years. Five 
annual rcturns arc calculated, R1 through K5 and size-adjusted abnormal rcturns, SAKI through SAR5 for each estimation pcriod. 
Further, avcragc annual rcturns (AK) and avcragc size-adjusted abnormal rcturns (ASAK) arc computcd over the test pcriod years I 
through 5. The annual returns arc calculated as the geometric average monthly rcturns for five 12-month pcriod after portfolio 
Ihrmation date. SAK is comp~ltcd as the annual raw rcturns on a firm stock less the avcragc size-decile returns to which a firm 
belongs. Kcturns arc calculated each year and averaged over the sample period and the time-series variation is used to compute the t- 
statistics using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The t-statistics are reported in bold. 
Table 5 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth 
Rates in Operating Earnings (OEG) 
Panel A: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year OEG 
PI0 -1.85 -2.33 3.55 3.66 2.33 2.06 1.60, 1.27 2.28 1.91 4.10 3.30) 
Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Three Year OEG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio 
R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SARS AR ASAR 
0.84 0.46 2.94 2.78 2.42 1.96 2.63 1.86 3.16 2.55 5.33 4.07 1 
Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Five Year OEG 
Return performance presented in this table is for portfolios formed based on OEG over one to five years prior to portfolio formation 
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See 
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R1 through R5, SARl through S A R S  as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in 
bold). 
Table 6 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in 
Earnings before Extraordinary Items (EBG) 
Panel A: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior One Year EBG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio R1 SARl R2 S A W  R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5  SARS AR ASAR 
1 PI0  -2.48 -2.93 3.76 3.93 2.50 2.26 2.11 1.83 2.19 1.82 4.36 3 .56)  
Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior Three Year EBG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
I - R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5  SARS AR ASAR 
I PI0  0.95 0.67 3.13 3.19 2.31 2.02 , 1.93 1.30 2.84 2.22 5.59 4.21 1 
Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior Five Year EBG 
Year 1 Year2  ' Year3  . Year4  Year 5 ' Average 
1.33 0.87 3.18 2.95 2.25 1.74 4.41 3.56 4.44 3.69 7.17 5.011 
Return ~erformance uresented in this table IS for uortfolios formed based on EBG over one to five years Drior to uortfol~o formation 
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See 
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R l  through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in 
bold). 
Table 7 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash 
Flow (CFG) as Defined in the Finance Literature 
Panel A: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year CFG 
PI0  -1.65 -2.06 3.76 4.08 2.53 2.30 1.40 1.16 2.23 2.08 4.55 3.87 1 
Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Three Year CFG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio R1 SARl  R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SAR5 AR ASAR 
/ PI0  1.14 0.88 3.53 3.64 2.47 2.12 2.04 1.63 3.11 2.49 6.54 4.79 1 
Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Five Year CFG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio 
R1 SARl R2 S A W  R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SAR5 AR ASAR 
Return performance presented in this table is for portfolios formed based on CFG over one to five years prior to portfolio formation 
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See 
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R l  through R5. SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in 
bold). 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash 
Flow (ACFG) as Defined in the Accounting Literature 
Average 
21.58 
14.21 4.21 
4.62 
5.34 4.83 
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See 
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R1 through R5, SARI through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in 
bold). 
Table 9 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Stock Returns (PRET) 
Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Five Year PRET 
PI0 2.38 2.12 5.26 5.96 2.73 1.96 2.94 1.85 3.68 2.16 5.65 4.52 
Return performance presented In thls table IS for portfolios formed based on PRET over one to live years prlor to portfolio formation 
(see   able 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See 
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R l  through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in 
bold). 
Table 10 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth 
Consistency in Sales (SG) 
CHG 2.60 2.16 2.11 : 1.81 1.73 , 1.29 1.04 -1.16 -0.89 -1.00 2.18 1.46 1 
Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in SG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SARS AR ASAR 
CLG 
CHG 
CLG- 
CGPl 2.13 1.62 0.60 0.24 -0.12 -0.28 -0.20 -0.38 0.19 0.04 1.44 0.59 
Panel C: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Four Year Consistencv in SG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio 
R1 SARl R2 ' S A M  R3 SAR3 : R4 SAR4 R5 SARS . AR ASAR 
CLG 
CHG 
CLG- 
CHG 
CGP4- 
CGPl  2.35 1.92 0.30 -0.06 0.27 0.04 0.16 0.01 -0.08 -0.35 1.35 
ieturn performance reported In t h ~ s  table IS for cons~stent growth portfol~os formed based on consistency In SG (See Table 3 for 
portfolio construction procedures). All portfolios are held without rebalancing for the next five years. Annual returns, R1 through R5 
and size-adjusted abnormal returns, SARI through SARS are calculated for each post-formation year (years 1 through 5). As well, 
average annual returns (AR) and average size-adjusted abnormal returns (ASAR) over the test period are computed for years 1 
through 5. The annual returns are calculated as the geometric average monthly returns for five 12 month periods after portfolio 
formation date. SAR is computed as the annual raw returns on a firm's stock less the average size-decile returns to which a firm 
belongs. The CLG-CHG in Panels A through C refers to the return gap between CLG and CHG portfolios. The return differential 
between the CLG-CHG portfolios and benchmark portfolios, i.e., CGP2-CGP1 and CGP4-CGPl, for each estimation interval are 
shown in the last rows of Panel B and Panel C. Returns are calculated each year and averaged over the sample period and the time- 
series variation is used to compute the t-statistics using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The t-statistics are reported in bold 
Table 11 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth 
Consistency in Operating Earnings (OEG) 
Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year Consistencv in OEG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio 
R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SARS AR ASAR 
Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in OEG 
Year 1 Year 2 ' Year3 . Year 4 Year 5 Average 
Portfolio 
R1 . SARl R2 - SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 , SAR4 R5 SARS AR ASAR 
CGPl  0.86 0.70 1.44 1.37 0.50 0.35 0.09 -0.19 1.32 1.03 2.51 2.08 
Panel C: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Four Year Consistencv in OEG 
Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in OEG (See Table 3 for 
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the 
definition and the calculation of R l  through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG 
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPI are defined in Table 10. 
Table 12 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Consistency in 
Earnings before Extraordinary Items (EBG) 
Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year Consistencv in EBG 
CHG -3.54 -3.79 2.82 2.72 1.54 1.26 0.90 0.79 1.82 1.61 1.45 0.91 1 
Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in EBG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year3 . Year4 Year 5 ! Average 
Portfolio 
R1 SARl R2 : S A W .  R3 j SAR3 ' R4 SAR4 ,  R5 , SARS AR : ASAR 
5.06 3.50 3.95 -1.09 3.87 -0.40 4.56 0.87 4.41 0.27 15.35 1.88 
CLG- -1.01 -1.50 5.96 5.43 4.56 3.81 1.87 1.17 4.85 4.07 3.25 2.59 
Panel C: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Four Year Consistencv in EBG 
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the 
definition and the calculation of R1 through R5, SARI through SARS as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG- 
CHG and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPl are defined in Table 10. 
Table 13 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Consistency in 
Cash Flow (CFG) as Defined in the Financial Literature 
Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year Consistencv in CFG 
Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in CFG 
Portfolio 
CLG 
CHG 
CLG- 
CHG 
CGP2- 
CGPl 
Year 4 
Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in CFG (See Table 3 for 
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the 
definition and the calculation of R l  through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG 
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPI are defined in Table 10. 
Table 14 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Consistency in 
Cash Flow (ACFG) as Defined in the Accounting Literature 
Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior One Year Consistency in ACFG 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Average 
I Q R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SAR5 ARA ASAR 
1 CHG -2.70 -3.03 3.74 3.58 1.50 , 1.50 0.58 0.55 1.37 1.30 1.84 1.41 1 
Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in ACFG (See Table 3 for 
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the 
definition and the calculation of RI through R5, SARI through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG 
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGP I are defined in Table 10. 
Table 15 
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on 
Consistency in Stock Returns (PRET) 
Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in PRET 
Portfolio 
CLG 
CHG 
CLG- 
CHG 
CGPZ- 
CGPl 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in PRET (See Table 3 for 
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the 
definition and the calculation of R l  through R5, SARI through SARS as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG 
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPI are defined in Table 10. 
Table 16 
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth 
Rates in Sales (SG) 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year SG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. SG Beta B/M Size SARl 
Model 1 0.072 -0.052 -0.090 
4.10 -3.42 -5.71 
Model 2 0.022 -0.054 0.012 0.044 -0.073 
0.81 -3.69 0.36 1.28 -3.43 
Model 3 0.029 -0.053 0.0 19 0.023 -0.060 -0.0 19 
1.02 -3.81 0.62 0.63 -2.97 -0.72 
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year SG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. SG Beta B N  Size SARl 
Model 1 0.1 12 -0.034 -0.126 
4.40 -2.22 -5.92 
Model 2 0.035 -0.040 0.050 0.041 -0.109 
1.09 -2.57 1.56 0.94 -4.84 
Model 3 0.03 1 -0.043 0.052 0.020 -0.094 -0.026 
0.94 -2.51 1.79 0.49 -3.60 -0.93 1 
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year SG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. SG Beta B N  Size SARl 
Model 1 0.083 0.007 -0.109 
3.49 -0.32 -5.1 1 
Model 2 -0.016 -0.001 0.076 0.042 -0.090 
-0.48 -0.04 2.80 1.29 -3.34 
Model 3 -0.020 -0.001 0.078 0.036 -0.079 -0.02 
-0.60 -0.03 2.87 1.12 -2.39 -0.93 
At the end of each post-formation year, the following three cross-sectional regressions, in which the slze-adjusted 
abnormal return (SAR) for each post-formation year (year 1 through year 5) 1s the dependent varlable, are estimated 
Model 1 SAR,, = Po+P,0,,+P4SizeJ pJr 
Model 2 SAR,, = Po +PIOJt +p2BetaJ,-l +P3B/MJ,., +P4SizeJ + p,, 
Model 3 SAR,, = ~o+PIO,, +P2Beta,,.l +P,B/MJ,.I +P4S~ze,,.l + PsSAR,l+ pJT 
SAR,, = the size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j in each of the post-formation year, where r varies from one to 
five years after the portfolio is formed. 
',I = the geometric mean of growth rates in past performance measures, i.e., SG, OEG, EBG, CFG, ACFG, and 
PRET, for various estimation horizons, ranging from one to five years prior to portfolio formation date t. 0 is 
sorted into scaled deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile) to 1 (for the highest decile). 
Beta,,., = Market beta for firm j. It is calculated using monthly stock returns over the prior 60 months (with a 
minimum of 36 months). Each year, Beta is sorted into scaled deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile) 
to 1 (for the highest decile). 
Table 16 (continued) 
BIM,,., = the book-to-market ratio for firm j. Both book value and market value are measured at the end of the fiscal 
year T-1 Each year, BIM is sorted into scaled deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile) to 1 (for the 
highest decile). 
Size, ,., = the market value of equity capital in million at the year-end T-I. Each year, Size is sorted into scaled 
deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile) to 1 (for the highest decile). Although SAR is the dependent 
variable in these regressions, SIZE is included in the regressions to avoid biased coefficient estimates on 0 
(e.g., Foster et al. [1984], Bernard [1987], Ali et al. [2003], and Desai et al. [2004]). 
SAR,, = the size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j in the first post-formation year. 
The average coefficients and t-statistics (in bold) reported in this table are based on annual 
regressions for the second post-formation year over the sample period using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
procedures. The decision to report the parameter estimates for two-year-ahead after portfolio formation is 
based on the similarity between regression estimates across all holding horizons. 
Table 17 
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth 
Rates in Operating Earnings (OEG) 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year OEG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. OEG Beta B/M Sue  SARl 
Model 1 0.092 -0.075 -0.082 
3.64 -3.07 -2.72 
Model 2 -0.013 -0.073 0.045 0.070 -0.060 
-0.48 -3.03 1.18 2.57 -2.34 
Model 3 -0.052 -0.056 0.05 1 0.042 -0.040 -0.039 
-0.18 -2.35 1.59 1.02 -1.53 1.26 
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year OEG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. OEG Beta B N  Size SARl 
Model 1 0.109 -0.065 -0.089 
4.74 -2.42 -3.33 
Model 2 -0.006 -0.063 0.063 0.050 -0.08 1 
-0.20 -2.56 1.99 1.34 -3.38 
Model 3 -0.001 -0.065 0.062 0.03 1 -0.049 -0.062 
-0.03 -2.65 2.27 0.80 -2.18 -2.26 1 
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year OEG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. OEG Beta B N  Sue  SARl 
Model 1 0.1 13 -0.077 -0.093 
5.64 -2.06 -2.13 
Model 2 -0.0 16 -0.070 0.074 0.067 -0.068 
-0.74 -2.30 2.58 1.54 -2.28 
Model 3 -0.018 -0.074 0.075 0.052 -0.038 -0.060 
-0.67 -2.40 2.43 1.30 -1.22 -2.35 
The regression results reported in this table are for portfolios based on OEG. See Table 16 for regression models, 
definition and calculation of regression coefficients, and t-statistics (in bold). 
Table 18 
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Earnings 
before Extraordinary Items (EBG) 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year EBG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. EBG Beta B/M Size SARl 
Model 1 0.078 -0.069 
4.08 -3.44 
Model 2 -0.024 -0.070 0.043 0.078 -0.05 1 
-0.77 -3.38 1.07 2.46 2.32 
Model 3 -0.025 -0.064 0.043 0.042 -0.018 
-0.73 -3.69 1.20 1.34 -0.98 
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year EBG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. EBG Beta BIM Size SARl 
Model 1 0.101 
4.57 
Model 2 -0.023 
-0.86 
Model 3 -0.020 
-0.070 
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year EBG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. EBG Beta B/M Size SARl 
Model 1 0.079 -0.059 -0.043 
4.50 -2.12 -1.88 
Model 2 -0.002 -0.057 0.030 0.034 -0.024 
-0.07 -2.39 0.90 0.89 -0.90 
Model 3 -0.002 -0.058 0.025 0.040 -0.009 -0.040 
-0.06 -2.35 0.70 0.95 -0.28 -1.65 
The regresslon results presented In t h ~ s  table are for portfol~os based on EBG See Table 16 for regression models, 
def in~t~on a d calculation of regresslon coefficients, and t-statistics (In bold). 
Table 19 
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash Flow 
(CFG) as Defined in the Finance Literature 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year CFG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. CFG Beta B/M Size SARl 
Model 1 0.094 -0.066 
4.61 -3.20 
Model 2 -0.010 -0.070 0.068 0.072 -0.076 
-0.40 -3.47 1.96 2.24 -3.00 
Model 3 -0.005 -0.050 0.058 0.068 -0.057 -0.041 
-0.19 -2.45 1.87 1 .SO -2.33 -1.64 
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year CFG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. CFG Beta B/M Size SARl 
Model 1 0.127 -0.082 -0.099 
6.04 -3.58 -4.56 
Model 2 0.030 -0.082 0.064 0.042 -0.085 
1.06 -3.95 1.67 1.21 -3.83 
Model 3 0.026 -0.082 0.058 0.024 -0.057 -0.048 
0.86 -3.84 1.73 0.66 -2.52 -2.27 
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year CFG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. CFG Beta B/M Size SARl 
Model 1 0.125 -0.076 -0.093 
4.32 -2.15 -3.42 
Model 2 0.007 -0.072 0.069 0.062 -0.075 
0.22 -2.38 1.77 1.57 -2.89 
Model 3 0.003 -0.074 0.063 0.057 -0.053 -0.045 
0.08 -2.36 1.79 1.27 -2.00 -1.55 
The regression results presented In thls table are for portfolios based on CFG See Table 16 for regresslon models, 
defin~t~on a d calculat~on of regresslon coefficients, and t-statistics ( ~ n  bold). 
Table 20 
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash Flow 
(ACFG) as Defined in the Accounting Literature 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year ACFG 
I Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. ACFG Beta B/M Sue  SARl 
Model 1 0.1 13 -0.080 -0 124 
4.69 -3.86 -3.36 
Model 2 0.015 -0.082 0.087 0.074 0.102 
0.53 -3.99 1.75 2.95 2.85 
Model 3 0.025 -0.065 0.087 0.028 0.068 -0.040 
1 0.69 -3.12 1.59 0.69 2.15 -1.42 1 
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year ACFG 
I Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. ACFG Beta B/M Sue  SARl 
Model 1 0.151 -0.089 -0.109 
5.93 -4.60 -3.98 
Model 2 0.046 -0.090 0.120 0.047 -0.102 
1.49 -4.73 1.84 1.27 -4.04 
Model 3 0.039 -0.089 0.062 0.028 -0.080 -0.049 
1.16 -4.71 1.18 0.69 -2.79 -2.05 1 
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year ACFG 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. ACFG Beta B/M Sue  SARl 
Model 1 0.142 -0.084 -0.098 
4.07 -2.31 -3.69 
Model 2 0.022 -0.075 0.066 0.057 -0.097 
0.59 -2.70 2.58 1.07 -3.76 
Model 3 0.017 -0.075 0.074 0.032 -0.095 -0.046 
0.37 -2.56 2.53 0.61 -2.74 -1.55 1 
The regression results presented in this table are for portfolios based on ACFG. See Table 16 for regression models, 
- 
definition and calculation of regression coefficients, and t-statistics (in bold). 
Table 21 
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Stock Returns (PRET) 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year PRET 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. PRET Beta B/M Sue  SARl 
Model 1 0.135 -0.107 -0.082 
4.22 -4.72 -4.14 
Model 2 0.127 -0.121 0.003 -0.0 13 -0.075 
3.23 -5.63 0.09 -0.38 -3.02 
Model 3 0.126 -0.110 0.017 -0.043 -0.075 -0.032 
3.01 -5.09 0.49 -0.98 -2.68 -1.18 
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year PRET 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. PRET Beta B/M Size SARl 
Model 1 0.148 -0.082 
3.80 -3.60 
Model 2 0.1 12 -0.100 0.027 
2.97 -4.19 0.66 
Model 3 0.117 -0.123 0.039 
3.18 -4.57 1.05 
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year PRET 
Regression Parameter Estimates 
Models Int. PRET Beta B/M Sue  SARl 
Model 1 0.161 -0.106 -0.072 
6.02 -4.25 -2.73 
Model 2 0.067 -0.101 0.078 -0.024 -0.066 
0.94 -5.07 1.55 -0.53 -1.88 
Model 3 0.077 -0.1 14 0.082 -0.033 -0.050 -0.054 
1 .OS -5.35 1.69 -1.69 -1.27 -2.29 
The regresslon results presented In this table are for portfol~os based on PRET See Table 16 for regression models, 
defin~t~on a d calculat~on of regresslon coefficients, and t-stat~st~cs (In bold) 
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